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Abstract 
With oil and gas production reaching its tail end on many fields on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf, the industry is looking towards the Arctic to start exploration and production. It is 
estimated that 14% of the worlds remaining oil and natural gas reserves are found in Arctic 
areas, most of these offshore. The harsh Arctic conditions concerning climate, lack of 
infrastructure and long distances generate challenges in respect to keeping risk low and 
regularity high on oil and gas producing installations in this area.  
The research presented in this thesis highlights the challenges concerning operation and 
maintenance of offshore production installations in Arctic areas. Challenges to Reliability, 
Availability, Maintainability and Supportability (RAMS) in Arctic areas are identified. 
The case study conducted as a part of this study indicates that maintenance will be essential in 
keeping regularity high on an offshore oil and gas production facility in the Arctic. Harsh 
operating conditions can cause increases in failure frequencies, failure modes and failure 
mechanisms resulting in a need for different and more frequent preventive maintenance. 
Many maintenance tasks and corrective repairs can be expected to be more time consuming in 
the Arctic than in temperate areas. Furthermore, the economic model gives an overview of the 
increase in man-hours and costs when the activities are planned to be conducted in arctic 
areas.   
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the background and the aim of this thesis, the scope 
and limitations are also explained. 
1.1 Maintenance in oil & gas industry: opportunities, issues and challenges  
Maintenance plays an important role in business success (Deming 2000, Löfsten 1999, 
Piltelton et. al., 1997). For the offshore oil and gas business maintenance expenses can be as 
high as 60% of the operating costs (OPL., 1991). The maintenance function has gone through 
big changes. From being a necessary evil where the maintenance personnel had a run-to-
failure philosophy to the maintenance being a part of the integrated business concept. Piltelton 
et. al. (1997) states that the reason for this change is that there is more competition in the 
market, this makes cost control very important. The machinery and equipment is becoming 
more complex and the market demands a degree of flexibility, quality and reliability of supply 
that can only be secured by reliable and well maintained equipment. Surveys carried out in the 
United States indicate that one third of all costs related to maintenance are wasted as a result 
of bad or unnecessary maintenance (Mobley, 1990). The most important factor for an oil and 
gas production installation is that it is profitable. Effective operations and maintenance 
together with new technologies can help in reducing costs and defend production on fields 
with lower production levels (NPD, 2009). An effective maintenance system can significantly 
contribute to competitiveness in a global market, because of lower production costs, less 
down time and a smaller loss of production. 
A definition of maintenance given by the British standard BS EN 13306 (2008) on 
maintenance is: “All technical, administrative and managerial actions during the life cycle of 
an item, intended to retain it in, or restore it to a state in which it can perform the required 
function. This includes dependability, cost reduction, product quality, environment protection 
and safety preservation of the facilities”. Bad maintenance or failures in maintaining 
equipment can lead to maintenance related problems. An example is the accident on the 
offshore oil platform Piper Alpha in the North Sea. On July 7, 1988 where 169 persons lost 
their lives in a fire that started because of a routine maintenance job. A test procedure of a 
backup propane condensate valve led to the removal of the valve, the maintenance crew 
couldn’t finish the job before evening and sealed the hole to continue the consecutive day. 
Later that evening a propane condensate pump stopped working and the backup pump with 
the missing valve was started. This led to a large fire. A series of unfortunate events then led 
to the catastrophic accident (Lord Cullen, 1990). This accident illustrates the importance of 
having a good maintenance and reporting system. 
The Norwegian continental shelf is entering its tail end phase, even though there are resources 
left for many years of production there are reason to believe that the largest fields are already 
found and put into production. As the production goes down in temperate areas off the coast of 
Norway the industry looks northward to start exploration and production in the Arctic areas 
north of Norway. This trend can be seen in all countries bordering to offshore areas in the 
Arctic. As traditional sources of energy are being depleted, there is an increasing interest in 
exploiting oil from technically challenging areas. Challenging areas means large depth fields, 
smaller fields and fields in geographically remote areas such as the Arctic. 
 The true extent of resources in the Arctic area is unknown, the US Geological Survey (USGS) 
have estimated that areas north of the Arctic circle have up to 14% of the world’s oil and natural 
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gas reserves, and this is a conservative estimate because of the vast areas ignored in the study 
due to lack of data (Coomber, 2008). Despite of a gradual increase in temperatures and a 
decrease in the Arctic ice covers there are large challenges for equipment, designers and 
operators of these Arctic installations. To maintain production regularity on an Arctic 
installation similar to an installation in temperate areas there will be different changes  in 
design, engineering and in operation and maintenance.  
1.2 Problem description 
Arctic conditions in the form of climate, darkness, ice, remoteness to infrastructure, etc. will 
cause different and bigger strains on personnel and machinery than temperate conditions do, 
this together with a lack of historical and factual data on offshore activities in Arctic areas 
makes maintenance a challenging field. To keep risks and the regularity of an offshore 
installation in Arctic areas similar to what we find at an installation on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS) one has to be prepared to face these challenges.   The focus area for 
this assignment will be to identify challenges for Arctic offshore maintenance, and look at 
how the Arctic conditions will change reliability, availability, maintainability and 
supportability, and how changes in preventive maintenance can help keep regularity as high in 
the Arctic as on the NCS. The problem description is split into three main questions listed 
here: 
 How will Arctic conditions affect Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and 
Supportability (RAMS)? 
 How will Arctic conditions affect preventive maintenance on an oil and gas 
production installation contrary to an installation on the NCS having similar demands 
for regularity?   
 How can the regularity be kept as high in the Arctic as on the NCS? 
1.3 Thesis scope and objectives 
The main objective of the thesis is to establish how Arctic conditions will affect reliability, 
availability, maintainability and supportability on an oil and gas production installation in the 
Arctic. This will be reached through the following four points: 
 Define how RAMS will be influenced by Arctic conditions 
 Identify and suggest important design- and operational implications helping in keeping 
risk and regularity in the Arctic similar to the NCS 
 Study statistical and experience data to establish failure frequencies, failure modes, 
failure mechanisms and preventive maintenance on the NCS, and use these data 
together with the information from sub objective one and two to make a FMECA 
analysis and identify differences in these factors in the Arctic compared to the NCS 
 Study statistical and experience data to develop a model to estimate increases in man-
hours and costs Arctic conditions cause on maintenance and corrective repairs 
1.4 Limitations 
 Statistical data are available for the NCS through the OREDA-2009 database. There 
are very little data present for machinery in Arctic areas, this means the case studies 
for Arctic areas haven’t got any quantitative values on failure frequencies.  In the 
thesis the failure modes and failure mechanisms expected to have an increased 
frequency are identified but not quantified 
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 Large plant specific variables are expected for Arctic areas, this has further limited the 
possibility to quantify data 
 The two systems covered in the case study are large systems with large amounts of 
components. A limitation on the equipment covered in the case study is set, meaning 
that some parts of the systems and bordering systems are neglected, examples are the 
electro chlorination packages, the foam and the water misting systems, etc. 
 The systems considered in the case study have an identical setup in the Arctic and on 
the NCS. For much of the equipment considered increase in redundancy levels and 
alternative setup of the equipment could increase reliability and maintainability 
1.5 Methodology 
 Most of the research is done based on literature studies of reports, documents, books 
and databases and through informal interviews with experts.  This method is 
qualitative meaning it is based on non-numerical data collection 
 Some statistical data are obtained from statistic databases, reports and books. The 
research made based on these data is quantitative, meaning that numerical observation 
values are analyzed and interpreted to get results 
 
Based on the data collected in the literature study and in the interviews with experts a case 
study is conducted. In this case study necessary changes in preventive maintenance between 
the Arctic and the NCS to obtain similar production regularity is defined, and differences in 
failure frequencies, failure modes and failure mechanisms are identified. In the case study a 
model is developed for predicting the increase in man-hours and costs for a preventive 
maintenance procedure or corrective repair in Arctic conditions compared to Norwegian 
Continental Shelf conditions. To develop this Model Monte Carlo simulation is used. Monte 
Carlo simulation is a tool that is good to model phenomena with large uncertainties in the 
input. In the Monte Carlo simulation probability distributions are assigned to the quantitative 
data obtained in the research. Repeated computation of these inputs gives an estimate of the 
increase in man-hours.  
1.6 Thesis outline 
As described in Figure 1.1 the thesis has eight chapters, where the first chapter is an 
introduction to the subject and the thesis. The second gives a theoretical background on the 
Arctic, maintenance, the factors Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Availability 
(RAMS), Arctic conditions, preventive maintenance scheduling and statistical theory. The 
third chapter is a deeper study into Arctic conditions and the effects these have on design, 
operations, machinery and personnel on an oil and gas producing installation. The fourth and 
fifth chapter show how these conditions will affect RAMS and how regularity of the 
installation can be kept as high as on the Norwegian Continental Shelf despite of the harsh 
conditions. This research is the basis for the discussion and case study presented in chapter 
six. Concluding remarks and suggestions for future research can be found in chapter seven 
and eight. 
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Figure 1.1 Outline of thesis 
Introduction part 
Theory Part 
Research part 
Discussion and 
conclusion part 
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2 Theoretical background 
In this chapter a theoretical background and introduction will be given on the the Arctic, the 
concept of maintenance, RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and supportability) 
thinking and the state of the art and limitations on knowledge on Arctic offshore operations 
and maintenance.  
2.1 The Arctic 
Orheim (2003) defines the Arctic as the areas above 66`33``N (the Arctic Circle), it is covering 
12 million km². This area is mostly covered with ice during parts of the year, but with climate 
change and melting ice caps larger and larger areas opens for geological surveys and oil and gas 
exploration. Together with a large demand for energy, problems with keeping up production in 
easier available areas and development of new technologies, exploration in these areas become 
more and more interesting. The common view that the Arctic is pristine and vulnerable makes 
the legislation considering pollution and outlets to sea and air very strict. The climate and dark 
season together with large distances and bad infrastructure makes logistics, spare parts and 
resupplying a large challenge in the Arctic.  
Denmark (Greenland), Canada, USA, Russia and Norway are the countries bordering the Arctic 
which are actively working to find hydrocarbons on their continental shelves.  The true extent 
of resources in the Arctic area is unknown, the US Geological Survey (USGS) have estimated 
that areas north of the Arctic Circle have 90 billion barrels (1,4x10
9
 m
3
) of undiscovered 
technically recoverable oil, and 44 billion barrels (7x10
9
 m
3
) of natural gas liquids. That means 
up to 14% of undiscovered oil and gas resources can be found in the Arctic regions, it is 
estimated that 84% of this is offshore resources. (U.S. Geological Survey, 2008) this is a 
conservative estimate because of the vast areas was ignored in the study due to lack of data 
(Coomber, 2008). Figure 2.1 and table 2.1 show undiscovered oil in the Arctic and the results of 
the 2008 U.S. Geological Survey appraisal. 
 
Figure 2.1 Assessment of Arctic resources color coded by assessed probability of the 
prescience of undiscovered oil and gas fields with recoverable resources greater than 50 
million barrels of oil equivalent (MMBOE) (USGS, 2008). 
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Table 2.1  Arctic prospective resource (U.S. Geological Survey, 2008) 
 
2.2  Maintenance philosophy 
The focus on maintenance and maintenance management has increased during the last 20-30 
years, before this maintenance was regarded as a “necessary evil” (Ref chapter 1). Further to 
this, the earlier run-to-failure philosophy means that the plant spends little money on 
maintenance other than on basic preventive machine adjustments and lubrication work before 
a machine breaks down. When the machine breaks down, the necessary repairs are done. This 
philosophy can lead to large expenses in spare parts inventory costs, high overtime labour 
costs, high machine downtime and lower production availability (Mobley, 1990). A more 
modern maintenance philosophy is preventive maintenance. In preventive maintenance the 
maintenance tasks and machine repairs are scheduled in intervals based on the expected life of 
a component, ideally the component is replaced or repaired just before it breaks. This is in 
most cases better than the reactive “run-to-failure” philosophy because it is possible to plan 
the repair work and schedule it in a way it has the smallest possible effect on the production 
and give the lowest possible costs.  There are some potential weaknesses to this method as 
well as the “run-to-failure” philosophy. Because of plant specific variables mean-time-
between failures (MTBF) are often hard to establish, resulting in maintenance work being 
scheduled too often leading to repairs of well working machines, or to seldom leading to 
downtime and shutdowns (Mobley,1990). In figure 2.2 figure this is illustrated, where 
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maintenance is scheduled to seldom for failure A, just in the right time for failure B and too 
early for failure C. 
Figure 2.2 Modified figure of timing of scheduled maintenance with respect to failures 
(Markeset, 2008) 
Development of condition monitoring technologies, micro processors and computer-based 
instrumentation used to monitor the condition of plant equipment together with a more 
competitive global market has made predictive maintenance more and more common and 
important. In the predictive maintenance way of thinking condition monitoring of components 
are used to detect, identify and prevent machine failures. Different methods and indicators 
such as vibration monitoring, thermography, tribology and visual inspections are used to 
provide data to ensure maximum possible intervals between the repairs, and to help make the 
maintenance work go as fast as possible (Mobley, 1990). Further to this Mobley points out 
that this method can give benefits in form of large reduction in maintenance costs, machine 
breakdowns, necessary spare parts inventory, machine downtime, overtime salaries and an 
increase in machine lifetime, productivity and profit for the company.  
As mentioned in the last paragraph a predictive maintenance strategy is based on condition 
monitoring. Condition monitoring has gone from its simplest form which is machine 
operators looking and listening for unusual sounds, to systematic measurements of different 
parameters, purpose built sensors, measuring equipment and tailor-made measuring 
techniques. With a constant increase in the capacities of electronic equipment allowing more 
and more data to be processed and stored together with easier communication by means of 
internet, satellite and other means of communication and a equipment price going down 
makes predictive maintenance more and more common. This leads to condition monitoring 
software systems are becoming increasingly sophisticated and has self diagnosis systems with 
easier result collection, analysis and storage. This development has led to a new way of 
working and thinking, where the condition monitoring process is not just used to predict the 
time between failures but also to improve the equipment reliability and increase the 
equipment performance (Dunn, 2007) 
In the oil and gas industry the term integrated operations is becoming increasingly important. 
Integrated operations means that fast communication links gives the possibility to transfer 
video-surveillance, data and dialogue between field installations and onshore centrals. 
Concerning maintenance aspects this makes it possible to use human resources more 
effectively, meaning it is no longer necessary with an expert on each field or each plant, it is 
enough with one expert sitting in central receiving information from the field. The signals 
from the condition monitoring sensors on the offshore facilities are sent directly to onshore 
centrals where trained personnel monitor the different machines and components. Sundberg 
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(2003) points out that integrated operations gives possibility to direct questions from the field 
to centrals in time zones where it is day so that no land based workers need to work during the 
night. Another very important aspect for integrated operations in the oil and gas business is 
the possibilities concerning the use of unmanned sub sea facilities. The condition monitoring 
of fields such as these must be based on sending, receiving and interpreting digital data. 
When moving into Arctic areas there will be changes in the maintenance compared to similar 
installations in more temperate areas. Advanced condition monitoring, computerized 
maintenance programmes and integrated operations will be imperal to cope with the Arctic 
climate, lower supportability, reliability and maintainability. The possibilities of unmanned 
subsea facilities can also eliminate many problems with climate, ice features, human factors 
etc. All of this will be addressed further in the coming chapters.  
2.3 State of the art for the Arctic offshore industry 
The system design and maintenance strategies are under constant development, experience 
and statistical data from over thirty years of oil production on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf exists. These data are gathered in for example the oil companies generic strategies, in 
government regulations and standards and in databases such as the OREDA database for the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. The OREDA project was started in 1981 as collaboration 
between The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and eight companies on the NCS which have 
gathered and analyzed data on equipment and systems on installations (OREDA, 2009). There 
is much literature on industry in Arctic areas but very little quantitative data. 
Industry in Arctic areas is not new, industries such as mining, shipyards and onshore oil and 
gas production are and have traditionally been important industries in the region. Even though 
offshore exploration started in the Beaufort Sea already several decades ago only a few 
production facilities are built and put into production. Already producing fields are Prudhoe 
Bay in Alaska, Offshore Newfoundland in Canada, the Petsjenga-Pechora peninsula in Russia 
and the Norwegian gas field Snohvit. Goliat is an oilfield in the Norwegian part of the Barents 
Sea scheduled for production start in 2013. In the north Caspian Sea, offshore Sakhalin and in 
Bohai Bay offshore China the offshore installations are facing problems with ice, 
temperatures and conditions similar to the ones we find in the Arctic and valuable lessons can 
be drawn from these fields (Offshore-technology.com, 2010). Several concepts have been 
used to cope with the harsh conditions offshore. Large gravity based structures, gravel islands 
and floating units (See figure 2.3). But these fields have all been situated close to the shore in 
shallow waters. A way to cope with deep water fields is to use floating production units and 
bottom subsea installations (Gudmestad, 2005). The most similar fields to the concept looked 
at in the assignment is the Terra Nova FPSO located on Grand Banks 350 km northeast of 
Newfoundland in 94 m water depth and the Sea Rose FPSO situated in the same area.  These 
are floating turret moored production vessels equipped with release systems that make them 
capable of disconnecting from the risers in case of heavy ice features threatening the 
installation.  To cope with the low temperatures affecting the machinery and systems 
extensive heat tracing combined with heavy insulation is used (Gudmestad, 2005). The Terra 
Nova FPSO is built on a design based on the Brown & Root PV150 which was originally 
designed for the Haltenbanken area in the North Sea, which have similar wave conditions as 
the Grand Banks. To cope with Arctic conditions it is dimensioned to take 2000 tonnes of 
superstructure icing, and it is strengthened with 3000 tonnes of steel to be able to withstand 
impacts with icebergs sized up to up to 100000 tonnes and sea ice up to 0,3 m thick. This steel 
reinforcement of 3000 tonnes along with the weight margin of 2000 tonnes of superstructure 
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icing increase the dead weight of the ship and thus decreases weight margins that can be used 
for topside processing and storage. The ship is also equipped with an ice radar which can 
detect ice features, and send out a dedicated towing vessel to try to tow the iceberg out of 
collision course, historical data show that this is successful in 48% of the time, when this does 
not work the vessel disconnects from the risers and sails to safety (Offshore Shipping Online, 
2000). 
 
 Figure  2.3 Arctic offshore oil and gas production facilities. 
2.4 Gap in existing knowledge 
As the industry moves northward new challenges occurs, the statistical and experience data 
from the NCS cannot be directly used when designing offshore installation and maintenance 
of these.  The large uncertainties in design factors in cold and Arctic regions are described in 
this table, shown at the Arctic challenge Barents Sea youth conference held by StatoilHydros 
Sverre Kojedal on the 18.04.2009 in Hammerfest. 
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Table 2.2 Uncertainties in design factors in Arctic areas. 
 
The matrix shows the scarcity of environmental data from Arctic areas. Statistic data on 
equipment and machinery are also scarce. Even though the systems looked into in the thesis 
are well known from NCS and from offshore production facilities in temperate areas and 
similar systems are already in use on floating production units in the Arctic, there is a gap in 
the knowledge on both design of systems, machinery and maintenance plans for the Arctic.  
Experience from the NCS together with the OREDA data can give us a good pin point for 
much of the equipment performance and failure data, but the information is not good enough 
to use directly under Arctic conditions because it does not take into account the difference in 
operating conditions. In general, quantitative data from Arctic areas is hard to obtain, 
probably due to the small amount of industry and experience in the area. 
2.5 Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Supportability (RAMS) 
RAMS is an abbreviation for Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and supportability. 
These are keywords that are important to focus on in design and engineering of an oil and gas 
installation to help ensure a highest possible regularity, low repair times and a reliable 
installation. In the next paragraph this will be further explained. Arctic conditions will have a 
large impact on RAMS, these effects will be thoroughly explained in chapter 4.  
2.5.1 Reliability:  
The reliability of a system or a component is often defined as: “The ability of a system to 
perform its required functions under stated conditions at a given instant of time or over a 
given time interval, assuming that the external resources are provided” (ISO, 2006). 
Reliability is a design engineering principle which makes use of scientific and statistical 
knowledge to assure that a system will perform its intended function for the required duration in 
its operating environment. This mean there has to be designed in an ability to maintain, test and 
support a system through its lifetime. The reliability of a system is its performance over time 
(IEEE Reliability Society - Reliability Engineering, 2010). Reliability is quantified as MTTF 
(Mean Time To failure) for non-repairable components and MTBF (Mean Time Between 
Failure) for repairable components, this is the expected time to failure for a component (Speaks, 
2001). It is important in the design phase and in the selection of equipment phase to gather 
information on MTTF and MTBF of the different components and to use engineering methods 
such as block diagrams and fault trees which is graphical means used to evaluate the 
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relationships between different parts of system. The reliability of a system is increased through 
using more reliable parts or through redundancies.  
The lower the reliability is on a system or component, the larger is the probability of a break 
down, which can lead to downtime, loss of lives and environmental pollution.  To increase the 
reliability we have to make more robust components and design in redundancies. This is 
costly, so it has to be balanced against the cost factor to get the optimal result (ref. figure 2.4). 
Larsen (2007) has stated that the design should be optimized in regards to: 
 Requirements to the safety of the equipment obtained from risk analysis and 
overall acceptance criteria in regards to HSE 
 Requirements from standards 
 Requirements to design or operations given by authority regulations 
 Project constraints like budget, realization times and national and international 
agreements 
 Requirements to market performance 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Reliability vs. cost 
2.5.2 Availability:  
The definition of availability is given as: “The ability of an item (under combined aspects of 
its reliability, maintainability and maintenance support) to perform its required function at a 
stated instant of time or over a stated period of time” (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). 
 The formula for average availability is given as: 
[1]  
Reliability 
Costs 
Cost of disruptions 
 
Cost of counter measures 
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This formula gives the availability where MTBF is the parameter mean time between failures, 
which means the expected time to failure and MTTR is the mean time to repair showing how 
much time it takes to repair the component after it has failed.  
The higher the number A is, the higher the availability of the component. Another more 
intuitive way of understanding it is if the availability of a system is 90% the downtime is 
10%, which adds up to 365x0,1 = 36,5 days per year. In principle an oil and gas producing 
installations are designed for continuous operation, but shutdowns and maintenance leads to 
downtime. The goal for availability is assigned a percentage value less than 100%, because 
the downtime will cost less than 100% reliable equipment and operations. 
2.5.3 Maintainability: 
Birolini (2007) defines  maintainability as “the ability of an item under given conditions for 
use, to be retained in, or restored to, a state in which it can perform a required function, when 
maintenance is performed under given conditions and using stated procedures and 
resources.”  Further to this he states that the objective of maintainability in a system is to 
minimize maintenance time and labor hours considering design characteristics such as 
accessibility, standardization, interchangeability, standardization of tools, etc. Measures of 
maintainability are generally related to distribution of time needed for the performance of 
specified maintenance actions such as mean-time-to-repair (MTTR).  
 
The theory behind maintainability is to ensure component design that provides the equipment 
the attributes needed for it to be serviced and repaired efficiently and effectively. The general 
objective is thus to maximize the availability and uptime of the component through making it 
easy maintainable.  Niebel (1994) states that there are some fundamental principles for 
designing for maintainability, it is important to implement these in the design and planning 
phase since it is hard to change after the construction phase, these principles are listed here: 
 Strive to minimize the need for maintenance, eliminate it if it economically 
feasible. Have focus on which parts, materials or design changes can be 
implemented to do this 
 Minimize the frequency and complexity of the maintenance tasks. This can be 
done by the use of standardized parts, quick disconnect and connect parts for quick 
operations, and a conscious use of standardized tools and easy access 
 Strive to make the maintenance easy, so the personnel won’t need extensive 
training and the work can be done by different workers 
 Make good and clear routines to ensure that the mechanic, electrician or 
automatician is not forced to use a lot of initiative and judgment. Establish how 
much training and education the maintenance personnel need to do to have a 
balanced and good ability to do both preventive and possible unique maintenance 
 Have good preventive maintenance plans, planned maintenance is most often 
much easier to do and to acquire personnel and resources to do than run to failure 
maintenance 
 Provide accessibility to all equipment and components requiring maintenance, 
removal, inspection or adjustments. This can be very hard to ensure for all 
components in because of  space problems 
 Provide possibilities of easy fault identification through censoring, inspection 
windows  and trouble shooting charts and fault tree diagrams 
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  Make it easy to use performance measures to predict the need for maintenance. 
This can be done by using speed, vibration, noise measurements, use 
instrumentation and test points wherever it is feasible 
 Use posters, signs, part numbering and color codes to make it easy to identify 
components, component rating, type of lubricants, fuels, etc.  
 Use standard tools wherever it is possible for easy work 
 Have a good spare parts philosophy and plans, to have parts present to prevent 
downtime 
 Have a plan on the use of cranes, hoists and lifting equipment. With for example 
dedicated rail hoists for heavy equipment that have to be maintained or replaced 
 Provide parts with long lives, strive to put the parts in assemblies so they can be 
changed in one operation and provide self adjusting components where it is 
possible 
 Use vibration isolators where it is needed and use materials that do not corrode in 
its operating environment 
2.5.4  Supportability: 
The term supportability refers to the characteristics of the system design and installation that 
enable effective and efficient maintenance and support through the life cycle of the product. 
This means that in the design of the system we do not only have to think of the reliability and 
maintainability characteristics, but also the support infrastructure we have available to use to 
fulfill the demands of the maintenance process (San Jose University, 2010). 
In the design and operation phase of an installation it is important to have a support 
infrastructure to support and ensure high reliability, availability and maintainability. Table 2.3  
illustrates different elements of support that will affect the supportability 
Table 2.3 Factors influencing supportability modified from Gross (2002) 
Supportability issues: Description: 
Maintenance personnel 
Sustaining support and maintenance crew 
installation 
Training and training 
support 
Ensures competence and skills to do 
necessary maintenance and repairs 
Maintenance facilities 
Facilities to support scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance 
Support equipment 
Tools, conditioning monitoring, calibration 
equipment, etc. 
Storage and transportation Transportation and infrastructure 
Computer rescources 
Software necessary to support 
maintenance, databases, operation and 
maintenance instructions etc. 
Supply support Spares, consumables, special supplies, etc. 
Integrated operations 
Support from shore based centrals through 
transfer of real-time data. 
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Spare parts:  
Gross (2002) asserts that “ The best maintenance system only work as well as the parts, 
inventory and supply system that supports it”. 
An important factor when looking at supportability is the spare parts. Spare part selection and 
storage of these are critical for ensuring the installations regularity and uptime. The risk of 
down-time is reduced the bigger the spare part storage is, but it is important to find a balance 
(Niebel,1994). Too large spare parts storage can lead to degradation, disappearing, space 
consuming store rooms, much weight, reducing asset ownership, etc.  
When making spare part plans it is important to be aware and have thought through: 
 Uptime requirements (can downtime when parts are obtained be afforded) 
 Costs (what is the inventory holding costs) 
 Parts accessibility (How fast can the parts be obtained) 
 Purchase price: Price of part or component 
 Loss consequence: What is the consequence of not having the spare part. This 
varies with oil price and economic climate 
 Holding cost: The lost opportunity of investing the money in other projects or 
financial institutions, and the cost of warehousing, which is the cost of storage, 
scavenging and administration. An oil company on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf works with a holding cost of 20% of the equipment price annually. 
 Redundancy: The redundancy of the system or component 
 Demand rate: Reliability data, failure data 
 Parts changed in preventive maintenance 
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2.5.5 Relation between Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and 
Supportability: 
Figure 2.5 show how reliability, maintainability, availability and supportability relates to each 
other and to facility output.  Reliability, Maintainability and Supportability are all factors that 
help ensure a high availability on the equipment, which again leads to a better facility output 
which means a higher uptime for an oil and gas installation. 
 
Figure 2.5 The relationship between some production assurance terms (Gao and Markeset 
2007). 
2.6 Statistical theory 
Risk is defined as probability of failure times the consequence of failure. Formula [2] show 
the equation for risk where the probability of accidents are multiplied with a numerical value 
for each accident and summed for each possible accident sequence (DNV, 2009). Aven 
(1992) points out that: “Risk is used to express the danger that undesirable events represents 
to human beings, the environment and to economic value”. 
[2]  
This formula shows how the risk R is a function of probability of accidents (P) and 
consequence of accidents (C). 
 
Frequency: Frequency expresses average number of events per unit of time per operation. In 
this assignment I have choosen to use to the frequency value described with the function 
described in formula [3].  
   [3]           
Formula [3] show the expected lifetime, ET is expected lifetime (MTTF), t is time and f(t) is 
the probability density function of the lifetime T 
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For most mechanical components the bath tub curve is a good way to describe the shape of 
the frequency of failures. 
 
Figure 2.6 Bath-tub shape of the failure rate 
In figure 2.6 we see that in the first period a component or equipment is in operation there is a 
decreasing intensity of failure. This is due to problems from manufacturing, run in failures 
etc. Next follows a period where the failure intensity is approximately constant, the failures 
here are mainly “random” failures. The intensity then increases due to wear and fatigue. The 
most ideal way to make a maintenance strategy is to buy material that is factory tested to 
eliminate most of the initial weaknesses, then schedule preventive maintenance just before the 
random failures happen and change or overhaul the unit before the wear and fatigue period 
starts. 
For some components the failure rate is described as exponential, meaning that the lifetime of 
the component is exponentially distributed (see formula [4]).  
[4]                   
Where F(T) is probability of failing at time T, λ is the mean number of failures per unit of 
time and t is time 
This gives a constant failure rate which means that the probability of failure is independent of 
how long the component has been working. The exponential distribution is often used to 
describe the lifetime of electrical components and for old mechanical units which have been 
in operation for a relatively long period of time and maintenance has led to different ages of 
the components in the unit (Aven, 2008). 
In the OREDA database it is assumed that all data is taken from the useful life phase, between 
the burn in and wear out phase in the bathtub curve. This means that the failure rate is 
assumed constant and exponentially distributed. Meaning that the component is considered as 
good as new as long as it is functioning and the failures are chance failures independent of age 
and use of the equipment. Based on this assumption the MTTF = 1/ λ (OREDA-2009) 
The failure rates used in the assignment is the mean value in a 90% confidence interval, I will 
use this and neglect the upper 95% and lower 5% percentiles in this assignment. 
Criticality: Aven (2008) points out that the criticality value is based upon the consequences 
of the component not working. The consequences are divided into: 
 The life and health of operating personnel 
 Environmental consequences of failure 
 Economic impact 
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The economic impact factor is divided into loss in production and maintenance related costs 
due to failure. Based on the seriousness of the consequences of a failure regarding these three 
factors the components get their criticality value (Aven, 2008). A utility pump will be 
assigned a much lower criticality value than a fire water pump. This implies that it might be 
more cost effective to let the utility pump run to failure or assign it with preventive 
maintenance frequencies much lower than for a fire water pump because a failure in this 
pump can lead to much larger consequences.  
The failure mode: The failure mode is the manner in which the component failure has 
occurred, examples of failure modes can be low output, fail to start, breakdown, etc. The 
failure modes are divided into critical-, degraded-, incipient- and unknown failures (OREDA,  
2009) where:  
 Critical failure: Complete loss of system capability 
 Degraded failure: Not critical, but is a partial or gradual failure which can develop into 
a critical failure 
 Incipient failures: failure that can lead to critical or degraded failure in near future 
 Unknown failure: Failure severity is not recorded or could not be deducted 
A critical failure results in 100% production loss, a degraded failure results in partial 
production loss and 100% loss during repair. Incipient failure does not cause production loss 
and the failure is found during other repairs or scheduled maintenance (DNV Consulting, 
2006). 
The failure mechanism: The failure mechanism is the cause for the failure mode, examples 
of this can be corrosion, vibration, etc.).  
Redundancy: In an item, the existense of more than one means at a given instant of time for 
performing a required function (NORSOK Z-0016,1998). 
A component capable of delivering the whole capacity is assigned a redundancy value 100%. 
Two components in parallell each capable of delivering 100% capacity is thus assigned with a 
redundancy value of 2x100%. This means that if there are two pumps with the capacity to 
deliver the designated amount of flow for a system, one pump can fail without the system 
failing. The redundancy is given as 2x100%.  
2.7 Preventive maintenance scheduling 
In the NORSOK standard Z-008 “Criticality analysis for maintenance purposes”, two 
different ways preventive maintenance can be established are described, either by use of 
detailed maintenance analysis or by the use of generic strategies, the points describing what a 
detailed maintenance analysis comprises of are quoted from the NORSOK STANDARD Z-
008. 
2.7.1 Detailed maintenance analysis: 
The NORSOK standard Z-008 states that a maintenance analysis comprises of the following 
elements: 
 Specific company authority requirements for maintenance and 
assumptions/requirements for/from risk analysis 
 Dominating failure modes with approximate probability 
 Failure mechanisms with approximate probability 
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 Repair time (approximate) 
 Selected maintenance activities to reduce the probability of failure 
 Detectability of failure 
 Experience from using a known maintenance strategy along with periodic monitoring 
of the result. If this is used on equipment which performs safety critical functions 
where a fault is not evident to the operator, the availability requirement shall be 
defined and the compliance verified by documented tests. The percentage of periodic 
testing resulting in “Fail to operate on demand” may be used as a performance 
indicator 
 Required competence of maintenance personnel 
 Estimated man-hours for maintenance activities 
 Repair time 
 Essential spare parts and lead time 
2.7.2 Generic maintenance concept: 
A generic maintenance concept is maintenance actions defined for a group of similar 
equipment working under similar frame contditions. These concepts are based on similar 
equipment, experience and statistical data. (NORSOK Z-008, 2001). The oil companies 
operating oil and gas installations make generic maintenance concepts for their equipment 
based on their experience and on rules and regulations. 
2.7.3 Procedure for preventive maintenance scheduling: 
Gross (2002) proposes a procedure to establish maintenance procedures which include the 
following steps: 
1. Establish scheduling: This means that the scheduling process must be established to 
make sure that the work orders are scheduled effectively. 
2. Break the facilities into logical parts: Break the facility or plant into logical parts 
based on physical structure, production processes etc. 
3. Develop an equipment list and assign equipment numbers: Identify and number all the 
pieces of equipment. The list of equipment will serve as the structure for tracking the 
maintenance activities. 
4. Develop and issue preventive maintenance instructions: In this step PM work order 
instructions for all of the equipment identified in the previous step . Use equipment 
manuals and prior experience to write work orders and schedule them. 
5. Locate and/ or develop equipment manuals: Obtain good manuals, continuously 
update these with own experience to make them better. 
6. Develop a managed inventory: Create a managed inventory system that tracks use and 
stock of spare parts, repair history, costs etc. Also make plans on how and where to 
store the parts and how to maintain the inventory. 
7. Monitor the programs effectiveness and make improvements. 
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3 Typical challenges in Arctic operations and maintenance 
When oil and gas exploration are moved into Arctic areas, there are several challenges which 
have to be addressed. These will be described in this paragraph. 
3.1 The Arctic climate 
The climate in the Arctic is harsh with strong, fast changing winds and low temperatures. The 
phenomenon polar low pressure can cause a year around sudden change of wind direction and 
increases in wind speed of 2-4 beaufort within a few hours (Gudmestad, 2005). There are also 
less metocean data collected here than for many other offshore areas. The low temperatures and 
strong winds together with the dark season significantly shorten the time spans for marine 
operations such as interventions, trenching pipe laying, maintenance, resupplying etc. Another 
feature of Arctic offshore areas is fog, these areas are very susceptible for heavy fog which can 
stay for long periods, Grand Banks offshore Newfoundland are considered to be the foggiest 
area in the world with over 200 foggy days annually  (Burt, 2007) . Another important aspect of 
the low temperatures is the problems, especially in the high Arctic with icing of platform 
superstructures and sea ice problems. Icing is a problem when the temperature is low combined 
with high air humidity or when low temperatures (T<-10
◦
C) combined with high wind speeds 
results in a spray blowing of the sea and freezing on the platform or ship superstructure causing 
loss of stability and ice layers covering the hull and the equipment.  
There are three fundamental ways that can be used to mitigate icing on the installation 
superstructure, this is thermal, mechanic and chemical removal. 
Thermal:  Thermal removal of ice and snow can either be done preventive or reactive, 
preventive means using constant heat in cold temperatures to keep ice from accumulating, 
reactive is to remove ice after it have adhered. This can be done either by electrical heating, 
flushing with warm water, high temperature and pressure steam or by hot air. The melted ice 
and snow drains overboard or into designated tanks if it is polluted (Braset, 2007). 
Chemical: Chemical removal of ice can be done either by lowering the freezing point of fluids 
by applying frost liquids. These chemicals have to be environmental friendly. The other method 
is to use paint that stops the ice and snow from adhering to surfaces. This paint is often very 
slippery when it is wet, and can only be used in certain areas like walls, below deck to stop sea 
spray from adhering to the superstructures and on pillars (Braset; 2007). 
Mechanical: Mechanical ways to reduce icing is to induce shear stress to the ice to break it, or 
crush it mechanically and shovel it overboard. This can be done manually by the platform 
personnel, with pneumatic panels, with high pressure water, through vibrations or with 
ultrasound (Braset; 2007).  
Other design implications of the cold and harsh weather is that the drilling deck must be 
enclosed to keep personnel and equipment sheltered from cold temperatures and weather, and 
the span between the sea surface and the drilling deck must be higher due to wave action. The 
platforms need heating systems to handle the icing problems. The installation must have the 
ability to shut down and restart without freezing and the firefighting system must work in cold 
weather. This implies that all fluid systems susceptible for freezing need flow assurance in the 
form insulation, anti freeze liquids, fluid circulation systems and fluid heating systems. The 
platform needs systems to stop formation of wax and hydrates in hydrocarbon systems such as 
pipes, risers and processing equipment. The evacuation systems must be designed for cold 
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climate and lubrication and sealing systems for cold conditions and the construction materials 
have to be suitable for operation in a very large temperature span. The cold temperatures may 
demand shelters on workstations and drilling decks, it is important that these are designed 
regarding to area classification, ventilation of gas, escape routes and explosion hazards. Snow 
and ice may also cover openings and hatches and make gangways freeze and become slippery 
(Sæbø, 2007). 
In the high Arctic cold weather makes sea ice in different forms an important aspect. Sea ice is 
a problem where low temperatures causes the sea surface to freeze into level ice which can 
cause large loads on the structure if it adfreezes to it, or drifts past it and complicates loading 
and offloading, resupplying and evacuation.  Ice ridges and/or ice bergs from calving glaciers 
also cause problems because of large impact loads on the installation due to collision or 
scourging of pipelines and structures at the sea bottom in shallow areas. Ways to mitigate this is 
to have effective ice management with ice breakers that can crush the ice or tow away ice bergs, 
good systems to detect ice features which can come in contact with the platform, to have ice 
breaking capabilities on tankers and supply vessels and to have plans on how to do loading and 
offloading operations in ice free periods or on a sheltered and ice free side of the installations 
(Gudmestad 2005).  
For gravity based structures problems with ridges and level ice can be lessened by using sloped 
structures which break the ice instead of crushing it, the tensile strength of ice is in the size 10 
times lower than the compressive strength , example of this kind of structure is the Molikpaq 
platform offshore Sakhalin. Another option is using large heavy concrete structures to protect 
the platform, this is used on the Hibernia platform on the Grand Banks. For FPSO`s the 
problem can be mitigated using quick disconnect risers with sub sea structures dug down in 
glory holes in shallow areas. This means that the FPSO can disconnect and sail away from the 
ice, and pipelines and subsea structures are put into pre-dug holes to be sheltered from ice 
scouring, this method is used on the Terra Nova and Sea Rose FPSO`s on the Grand Banks. 
The effect of the Arctic climate on production facility operations and maintenance can be 
summarized as: 
 Planning and timespans for resupplying, maintenance, interventions etc. is harder due to 
bad weather 
 Evacuation is harder due to bad weather and possibilities of sea ice 
 Icing 
 Possible problems with sea ice features like level ice, ice ridges, icebergs etc. 
 Strains on machinery and personnel due to cold climate and large temperature variations 
 Smaller weight and processing capabilities due to ice strengthening and topside weight 
safety margin because of icing 
 Poor visibility due to foggy conditions 
3.2 Darkness: 
Whole or large parts of the day and night will be dark in late autumn, winter and early spring in 
the Arctic. In this period visual observation will naturally be harder, this season also coincides 
with the worst weather and temperature periods making resupplying, maintenance and potential 
ice management more complex.  
The effect of  darkness on production facility operations and  maintenance can be summarized 
as: 
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 General operations and resupplying can be harder due to darkness  
 Strain on personnel can increase due to darkness 
3.3 Ocean factors: 
Large areas in the Arctic offshore are in large depths up to 1000 meters. This implies that the 
drill ships and rigs must be able to drill in deep waters and deep reservoirs and in some areas 
have means to break and cope with sea ice. The export tankers need to be designed with 
concern to the high environmental demands with clean classes, high security and ice breaking 
capabilities. Arctic pipelines need to be dimensioned to cope with cold temperature 
environment with hydrate inhibitors and insulation. The bad weather in the winter season cause 
large waves which means the span from the sea surface to the platform decks have to be larger.  
The waves caused by winds, especially in the autumn and winter season significantly shortens 
time spans for well interventions, work and resupplying operations (Gudmestad, 2005). Table 
3.1 describes the sea water temperatures and ice conditions measured by the Norwegian Polar 
Institute for some Arctic areas (Søreide et. al.,2003).  
Table 3.1 The Norwegian Polar Institutes temperature measures in Arctic waters, mean 
temperature (T), salinity (S) and ice concentration give, Ice ranking (1: open water, 2: open 
drift-ice, 3: close pack-ice). ArW, AtW, MIX: Arctic watermasses, Atlantic watermasses and a 
mixture of these. 
 
 
The effect of  Arctic ocean factors on production facility operations and  maintenance can be 
summarized as: 
 Limitations on operations due to large waves 
 Strain on machinery due to ocean temperatures sinking as low as -1,9C during winter 
season 
 Strain on machinery due to large temperature variations 
3.4 Material and lubricant characteristics in the Arctic  
When materials are affected by cold temperatures their thermo-mechanical properties change. 
These changes occur at a molecular level. Contractions cause stresses in the metals which 
strain the molecular bonds. This makes the metal more exposed to quick brittle breaks. There 
are different treatments that can be applied to metals to minimize this effect. Especially for 
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iron alloys which is widely used in machinery and structures have a narrow transition zone 
from ductile to brittle properties (Freitag, 1997). 
Cold weather welding is also an important aspect of metals in cold weather. A welding 
process melts a small part of a metal to adhere it to another, this creates a heat affected zone 
(HAZ) which has had a large temperature raise. If this area is cooled very quickly you get a 
zone with very brittle material. This can be mitigated by using post- and preheating. 
We can see the same effects in polymers. When the temperature drops these materials change 
properties and become stiff and brittle, this can be problematic in gaskets, sealings and hoses. 
This makes it important to use polymers which are made for the temperatures they are to work 
in, or change from polymer to elastomeric components, these parts are often more expensive. 
Fluids in cold temperatures change properties. Oil viscosity increase which changes its 
lubricating properties and make it harder to apply. At very low temperatures the oil reaches its 
pour point and stops flowing. If this happens both the risk of machine break downs and the 
wear between parts gets much higher. Especially for hydraulic systems a slight increase in 
viscosity of the oil can cause large strain on the system, hoses and filters.  A way to hinder 
these problems according to Freitag (1997) is to use Arctic graded oils which are more 
expensive, but have pour points below -59
◦
C. It is also important to keep the engine warm at 
all times, a way to do this can be to keep it running constantly and  use time to heat the engine 
before it starts running in cold weather.  
On an Arctic installation there will also be systems containing other fluids than oil, such as 
fresh water systems. When liquids freeze they increase in volume and can destroy systems 
and rupture pipes if they are not designed to operate in Arctic conditions. A way to mitigate 
this according to Braset (2007) is equip these systems with insulation, antifreeze liquids to 
decrease the freezing point, heating and/or systems circulating the fluids to keep them moving 
constantly. (Braset, 2007) 
The effect of  Arctic climate on materials and lubricants can be summarized as: 
 Change in material properties due to cold temperatures 
 Change in properties in lubricants and hydraulic oils due to low temperatures 
 Fluids freeze 
3.5 Political issues: 
The Arctic areas have a large environmental focus because of its vulnerability and pristine 
nature resulting in government legislations demanding zero discharges from the searching, 
installing and production phase of the installation. This means that all water draining from the 
platform has to be collected and cleaned or transported away, all chemicals and hydraulic fluids 
have to be environmental friendly and all drill cuttings have to be cleaned out deposited in a 
waste well or transported to shore. Wildlife protection and social cooperation with various 
groups of indigenous people are also important. Failure in doing this or any polluting of the 
environment will have a large impact on company reputation. An example of this can be found 
in the ENI practice on native inhabitants (ENI Norway, 2007) where the company has stated 
that it is obliged to let the natives actively participate in counseling based on their social and 
cultural values. And actively evaluate how the operations can affect the native people. 
Effects of political issues on Arctic operations and maintenance can be summarized as: 
 High environmental demands make CAPEX and OPEX higher 
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 Drain, storage and cleaning or transport of water from the installation to minimize 
outlets, increases demand for storage space and logistics 
 Transport of all cuttings to shore, increases demand for storage space and logistics 
3.6 Remote location and infrastructure: 
In the Arctic areas there is a shortage of infrastructure, qualified workforce, marine vessels, 
airports, roads, supply bases and deep water ports. This complicates the resupply situation and 
makes the installation vulnerable concerning spare parts, spare personnel and supplies. This 
makes it important for the platform to have a large deck space dimensioned for heavy loads not 
only to cope with snow- and ice loads, but also to be self sufficient with spare parts for an 
extended period without resupplies. 
If an installation is situated far from land, it will need to be self-sufficient in emergency 
situations. This applies for emergency systems, evacuation systems and oil spill response 
systems. Jensen (2010) states that the oil spill response systems are very insufficient in the 
Arctic at the present time. 
Another supportability problem in the Arctic is the quality of the weather reports. Especially for 
the Barents sea the there are few weather stations and weather sensors. Regular weather 
observations are done from stations at Svalbard, Bjørnøya, Hopen, Novalja Zemlja and from 
areas onshore in the Russian Arctic. But for the large offshore areas there are big gaps. Over the 
sea ice almost no weather observations are made. The current models are weak in these areas 
because they have problems in predicting and estimating polar lows and Arctic fronts and the 
rapid changes in weather these cause. Statistic data from wind and wave measurements from the 
area also have their limitations because of the rapid climate changes in the Arctic (Braset, 
2007). Arctic weather reporting are getting better and is a focus area, use of satellite 
observations and computer analysis will increase the quality of these reports together with 
increased cooperation between countries bordering the Arctic in sharing data and experience. 
Tuesday 27.04.2010 an agreement was made between the Norwegian minister of Science and 
the Russian minister of natural resources and environment on meteorological cooperation and 
sharing of meteorological data to increase quality (yr.no,  27.04.2010). 
The effects of remoteness of infrastructure on Arctic operations and maintenance can be 
summarized as: 
 Resupplying of spare parts and supplies can be complicated 
 Scarcity of qualified personnel willing to stay in the Arctic 
 Lack of emergency infrastructure and oil spill contingency measures 
 Lack of infrastructure for robust weather predictions 
3.7 Human factors in the Arctic: 
Human factors and ergonomics are considered to be a major contributor to operational safety, 
loss prevention and for optimization of system performance in the oil and gas business. Vinnem 
(2007) states that often that as much as 80% of accidents offshore are caused by personnel. This 
is a high number and there is reason to believe that it can increase in Arctic conditions. One 
reason for this is that manual performance is a combination of many abilities such as tactile 
sensitivity, hand dexterity and motor coordination, and cooling of body parts has direct effect 
on all of these aspects(Holmér et al.). 
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The physiological and mental effects cold exposure has on the human body and behavior are 
many. When the body is exposed to cold the metabolic rate is not sufficient to uphold a 
normal heat balance in the body which leads to a reduced blood supply. Blood is drawn from 
the extremities to prevent heat loss and to keep the internal organs warm leading to extremity 
cooling and a loss of sensitivity and grip strength. The cold exposure lead to a viscosity 
increase in synovial fluids in the body, which is a non- Newtonian fluid found in joint cavities 
to reduce joint friction, supply oxygen and nutrients and remove carbon-dioxide and 
metabolic waste (Johansen et. al. 1993). This viscosity increase causes slower movement, loss 
of strength and joint stiffness. Effects from scientific studies show that the cold exposure 
leads to a decreased level of vigilance, short term memory and general intelligence. Simple 
tasks remain unaffected whilst for complex cognitive tasks a clear effect is shown. Under 
more severe conditions long-term memory and consciousness are affected. These effects 
cause an increase in the risk for accidents and accidental injuries on the installation (Mäkinen 
et. al., 2006). Cold induced decrease in manual, muscular and aerobic performance, simple 
and choice reaction time, vigilance, ability to perform cognitive tasks, etc. (Holmér et al.). 
This means that all force, power, endurance, velocity, coordination and cognitive abilities are 
affected negatively. 
Another important aspect of working in the Arctic offshore is the winter season. Together with 
lack of infrastructure, the harsh weather, self sufficiency in emergency situations and the dark 
season this can cause a feeling of isolation which can cause depressions that can have a negative 
effect on the cognitive abilities of the personnel. Effects found in studies of personnel on 
Antarctic research stations have shown that 51,5% of the personnel showed signs of depression, 
47,6% had increased levels of irritability and anger, 62,1% had periods with impaired 
concentration or memory (Palinkas et al. 1995). 
Effects of cold and dark environment on operating personnel include: 
 Challenges in human-machine interface due to reduced sensitivity, dexterity, 
coordination and strength 
 Increased risk of damages to muscles and joints due to reduced blood flow and joint 
stiffness 
 Lowered sensitivity causes an impaired ability to feel burning, freezing, cuts and blows, 
increasing the risk for injuries 
 Discomfort from freezing, runny nose, shivering, stiff joints increase risk of hurrying 
and doing bad work and decreases concentration 
 Reduced alertness, short time memory, decision making ability and ability to do 
complex work leads to a higher risk of accidents 
 Prolonged exposure to dark and isolation can cause reduced cognitive abilities in 
personnel 
 All of these conditions will make it harder to get qualified personnel 
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4 Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Supportability 
(RAMS)  factors in the Arctic 
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Supportability are keywords that are important 
to design for when moving oil and gas production into the Arctic. The earlier in the design 
and planning phase these factors are considered the easier the RAMS measures are to 
implement. In the early phases it is easier to make design changes, choose better materials, 
change parts, concepts, etc. It is important to map factors such as degradation mechanisms 
that work on the machines in Arctic conditions, the working environment, common 
operational failures, human errors, historical data etc. Because of the challenges already listed 
in chapter 3 the systems and components should be designed with good RAMS 
characteristics. Markeset and Kumar (2001) states that: Where it is economically feasible and 
technically possible maintenance should be designed out, where this is impossible the systems 
should be designed for maintenance.  
4.1 Reliability  
In the Arctic there are several factors influencing the reliability of a system. The 
environmental factors will obviously influence the reliability through low temperatures, large 
temperature variations, strong winds, icing and snowdrift. These factors can decrease the 
lifetime (MTTF and MTBF) of a system which is not properly sheltered. The low 
temperatures will also brittle materials and increase the viscosity of many lubricating fluids. 
Another important factor is the skill level of the operating personnel. In the remote Arctic it 
might be harder to acquire competency and experts, this can lead to a faster degradation of the 
machines (Gao, 2009). This can be mitigated by having a strong focus on designing for Arctic 
conditions with trace heating, Arctic graded materials and oils, sheltered areas and through 
condition monitoring and tailored preventive maintenance. The lack of skilled personnel can 
partially be mitigated by having a strong focus on the development of internal competence for 
better control and coordination of the maintenance activities and to train the installation 
personnel to perform first line maintenance. But even though the installation is designed for 
Arctic conditions and the mechanical failure rate is expected to be the same as on the NCS, an 
oil company operating an installation in Arctic conditions has experienced system and alarm 
trips due to bad weather and instrumentation, valves and supply lines freezing up. Some of 
these trips cause the systems to shutdown and results in lower reliability. 
4.2 Availability  
A system in the Arctic will potentially have a lower reliability and maintainability and most 
definitively have a lower supportability than the same system on an installation on the NCS. 
For many cases this will lead to longer repair- and downtimes, and a higher frequency of 
failure, which means a lower availability (Ref formula [1]). A large potential problem for 
availability in the Arctic is the supportability, if a part needs to be supplied from shore, the 
distances are long from manufacturers, and the harsh weather can cause long delays. 
4.3 Maintainability  
Component/system maintainability will be influenced by metocean factors such as wind, waves, 
snow and icing. Location factors such as darkness, distance to market and suppliers and support 
factors like transportation, spare parts and the human factors in the form of lack of skilled 
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personnel and maintenance crews.  The harsh conditions can also affect the operation effectivity 
negatively, darkness and hard weather will make everything go slower and can make demands 
for more frequent maintenance intervals.  
As mentioned the Arctic climate and conditions have design impacts on the technical part of the 
platform, and on the physical and psychological performance of the operators. This makes it 
important to be very conscious of ergonomics when designing for maintainability. The 
International Ergonomics Association (2008) defines ergonomics as: “Ergonomics (or human 
factors) is the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of interactions among 
humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data 
and methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and overall system performance”. 
As mentioned in paragraph 3.7 (Human factors) climate is a potential stress factor on operating 
personnel making them wear cold protective clothing.(Duggan 1988) the consequence for 
ergonomics is that the body dimensions increase and the machines should be designed in such a 
way that it is possible to reach them with cold protective clothing and to use gloves when 
maintaining them. Lights should be places in such a way that the machines are properly 
illuminated. 
The use of remote monitoring through censoring and instrumentation to get a good basis to do 
predictive maintenance is a good solution to increase maintainability in the Arctic. In this way 
the results obtained from different sensor types (temperature, pressure, vibration, etc.) can be 
sent back to sheltered and heated rooms where the operators can read and react to the data 
without getting exposed to the cold temperatures and harsh conditions. 
 
Here follows an example of a maintainability issue from an installation on the NCS 
experienced by an experienced electrical engineer. On the platform it was demanded to wear 
working gloves whenever moving outside the living quarters. This rule made it very hard for 
electricians and electric engineers to do maintenance work on small electric components. On 
an Arctic installation one can expect lower temperatures resulting in a demand for thicker 
gloves further complicating maintenance tasks. To help keep maintainability high this must be 
mitigated either by designing out maintenance, making the maintenance easier through design 
changes, heating the workspace with permanent or mobile heaters and through sheltering of 
the workspace either permanently or temporarily during the work. 
4.4 Supportability  
In the Arctic there will be some challenges regarding especially transportation. The 
infrastructure is worse than on the Norwegian Continental shelf, both the suppliers of spare 
parts and special personnel are far away and these can be time consuming to acquire and 
muster. Together with this the metocean factors with bad weather, fog and darkness will limit 
the time windows for resupplying compared to facilities in more temperate areas. These 
factors will make parts accessibility lower combined with a higher demand rate because of 
bigger strains on the equipment and a higher price of parts due to long distances from the 
markets. All of these points make it important to have good systems on stock keeping, parts 
needed for preventive maintenance, and which spare parts to keep on the platform. One 
possibility is to increase the size of the storage space on the installation to be able to keep a 
bigger stock of spare parts than on an NCS installation where supportability is better. A 
challenge for an Arctic installation is that it needs safety weight margins for icing, meaning 
that the installation must be designed to cope with superstructure icing without capsizing, this 
will increase the deadweight and lessens weight margins for storage and process equipment.  
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In the Arctic integrated operations will be a very important mean to increase supportability.  
During the last decades the development in telecommunications and information transfer has 
made it possible to transfer large amounts of real time data from the installation to shore. This 
can solve parts of the competence and infrastructure problems, because it is possible for 
experts and competent personnel to sit onshore, for example in Stavanger, and look at real 
time video from the remotely located installation. This makes it possible for the offshore 
personnel on the platform to interactively diagnose and resolve problems together with the 
offshore experts (Panesar and Markeset, 2006). This can make the installation less reliant on 
vendor experts coming to the installation if something should fail. 
There will also be a big challenge concerning the evacuation of the platform in case of 
accidents in the Arctic. Evacuation systems have to be designed for self sufficiency because 
bad weather, ice, darkness, fog, long distances etc. which can make rescue work from ships 
and helicopters harder than for the NCS. 
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5 Oil & gas production facilities in the Arctic: Regularity and 
risks 
In this chapter the measures needed to take to reduce risk and increase regularity on an Arctic 
installation are listed. 
What we can expect when we move production into Arctic areas is that the risk of failure for 
the equipment will increase because of larger environmental strain. We can also expect that 
the consequences increase because of the fragile environment, the long distances, weather 
prohibiting rescue operations etc.(formula [2]). This means we can expect a shift in system 
and component criticality to a higher level when we move into the Arctic. Regularity is a term 
used to describe how a system is capable of meeting its demand for performance. 
When looking at how to decrease risk and increase regularity, the RAMS measures explained 
earlier in the thesis are important (ref. chapter 4). As mentioned the Arctic conditions have 
different impacts on all of the factors in RAMS, this will have to be considered in design of 
both technical- and maintenance design and in design of the support strategies of the 
installation. To get the same risk as on the NCS for an oil and gas production installation in 
harsh Arctic climate, new designs and other maintenance measures either to lessen the 
consequences or the probability of failure has to be used. These measures in designing for 
RAMS are also similar to the ones which must be taken to keep regularity as high as on the 
NCS.  For Arctic areas it might be hard to obtain data on RAMS characteristics meaning 
information on repair times for exposed equipment, failure frequencies and logistic delay 
times might be hard to establish. In the report “design for high performance for offshore 
production facilities in remote harsh and sensitive areas” by Tore Markeset three key factors 
affecting production performance are identified, and must be checked for when designing the 
systems and the maintenance for these (Markeset, 2008): 
 Will the equipment be placed in such a way that it will be exposed to harsh and cold 
environment.  
 Will the delivery time for the spare parts be affected due to location, infrastructure or 
weather?  
 Will the system need to be modified due to environmental requirements? 
These three questions will also be essential to identify to keep the regularity high on systems 
in the Arctic. In the standard NORSOK Z-016 ways to keep regularity high is divided into 
technical and operational measures, it can be argued that many of the measures are of both 
technical and operational character, but a division is made. The technical measures being 
choice of technology, redundancy at a system level, redundancy at equipment or component 
level, functional dependencies, capacities, instrumentation/automation philosophy, reduced 
complexity, material selection, selection of make etc. And the more operational factors are 
ergonomic design, protection from the environment, reliability testing, self-diagnosis systems, 
buffer and standby storage, bypass, flaring, utilization of design margins, spare parts, 
maintenance strategy and maintenance support (NORSOK Z-016, 1998).  
The American Bureau of shipping (ABS, 2008) which is a classification company have made 
a design guide for ships operating in cold environment, many of the recommendations in the 
design guide can be directly transferred to technical measures to keep regularity high on 
Offshore installations in the Arctic, these will be listed and explained here together with 
technical measures to keep regularity high and risks low in Arctic conditions based on 
NORSOK Z-016: 
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 Use analyses and pre-engineering: This will be very important because experience data 
is scarce for offshore installations in Arctic areas (ref table 1.1). Focus on this point 
can throw light on different challenges and give better RAMS characteristics and 
regularity 
 Use materials and liquids that can cope with Arctic conditions: Essential for high 
regularity in Arctic conditions 
 Use a design that makes maintenance as easy as possible: Based on the findings on 
maintainability in Arctic conditions (ref paragraph 4.3). A higher maintainability will 
give better availability and regularity 
 Use components and systems with high reliabilities and redundancies where possible: 
Higher redundancies and component reliability will lead to fewer failures and a higher 
uptime. This will reduce the consequences of a component failure, and will lessen the 
problems caused by lower maintainability and supportability 
 Use extensive heating and heat tracing: Essential to keep up reliability of machinery 
and process equipment affected by cold temperatures 
 Valves and closures should be selected and located to avoid freezing  on either side, 
and situated in such a way that they are not subjected to accumulation of ice and snow. 
Moving parts should be heated continuously or prior to operation 
 Pipes must be designed with good drainage, heating systems and circulation systems 
where they are subjected to temperatures which can lead to fluid freezing 
 Tank vents must be placed in such a way that they are not clogged by freezing, snow 
or ice accumulation 
 Systems such as hose reels and fire hydrants must be placed in such a way that they 
are not subjected to accumulation of ice and snow. These should be heated to ensure 
operation even in cold areas 
 Precautions must be made to prevent freezing up of nozzles on sprinkler and water 
systems 
 All electrical cables exposed for low temperatures must be protected 
 All control panels exposed to cold should be equipped with space heaters 
 Heat tracing, de-icing systems and insulation should be used effectively 
 Additional temperature and flow monitoring 
Here operational measures to keep regularity high and risks low in Arctic conditions will be 
listed: 
 Design for maintenance in Arctic conditions: This will directly increase 
maintainability and lower repair times, and it may indirectly increase reliability 
through better maintenance. And in that way increase the regularity 
 Condition monitoring systems: Increases reliability and maintainability of the systems 
 Keep a high degree of internal competence: A higher degree of internal competence 
will make the installation less dependent on external experts and increase regularity 
through less downtime due to low supportability 
 Use integrated operations: Integrated operations will make the installation less 
dependent on external experts and lessen the effects of low supportability 
 Good spare part plans, and large storage capacity: Will lessen downtime due to low 
supportability 
 Good preventive maintenance plans: Good preventive maintenance plans will lessen 
downtime and thus increase regularity 
 Databases for experience, and experience based upgrading on the maintenance of the 
installation: This point will lead to a documentation of experience which will make it 
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easier to identify failure mechanisms and modes, react to these and increase regularity 
of the installation 
An illustration of a problem for regularity and risk in the Arctic is topside design. Platforms 
on the NCS are built with an open design to ensure ventilation to mitigate accumulations of 
gases from leaks and reduce pressure from possible explosions. In the Arctic the platform has 
to be more sheltered and built in to stop icing and to ensure the possibility to perform 
maintenance on systems and process equipment. A way to mitigate this is a design proposed 
at the 2008 meeting Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) conference on Health, Safety and 
Environment in Oil and Gas exploration and Production held in Nice, France at the 15-17 
April 2008. The proposal is to use rotating wall elements together with gas detectors, which 
opens and ventilates the sheltered areas when a leak or accumulation of gas is detected 
(Høiset et al. 2008). The open design reduces risk through lessening the probability of 
explosions and lessening the consequences. For the Arctic an open design will possibly lower 
maintainability and reliability due to exposition to the harsh conditions, while a closed design 
will increase the risk of explosions and fires. The design proposed at the SPE conference is a 
measure that will both reduce the risk and keep the equipment and personnel sheltered, but it 
will be a cost factor in building and operating the installation (Ref figure 2.4 graph on 
reliability vs. cost). 
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6 Discussion of results 
A case study is conducted to identify the differences in preventive maintenance needed 
because of differences in RAMS factors on an installation on the NCS and in the Arctic when 
the aim is to have a similar production regularity. The case study starts with the procedure 
used to establish preventive maintenance routines and schedules. The next paragraph 
describes the systems. Based on the research study conducted the effects Arctic conditions 
will have on the equipment and components are identified. This information is gathered in 
FMECA analyses of the components in the system (ref. appendix A and B) where the 
differences in failure modes, failure mechanisms, failure frequencies, and preventive 
maintenance needs are identified. This is followed by description of failure scenarios Arctic 
conditions can cause on the two systems. 
Based on the results from the FMECA analysis and the research conducted on Arctic 
conditions in the thesis, a model is developed to estimate the increases in man-hours and costs 
that can be expected in Arctic areas due to differences in RAMS factors. 
6.1 Preventive maintenance scheduling 
The procedure explained in paragraph 2.8 on preventive maintenance scheduling is used to 
establish the PM-routines. It is focused on the points two, three, four and five. The systems 
are split into main parts based on the components function, and further into components 
which are required for the main part to perform its main function. Each of the sub units is 
given a criticality value and the redundancy is identified.  
When the criticality value and the redundancy are identified, information regarding failure 
modes, failure mechanisms and frequency of failures are gathered from the OREDA database. 
Maintenance needs are gathered from generic maintenance plans from two oil companies 
working on the NCS, experience data gathered in talks with engineers at a company working 
with maintenance of offshore installations and vendor documents from the equipment 
described in the systems. Based on these data together with the level of importance and 
criticality of the equipment the Preventive maintenance schedules are made. The results 
obtained are shown both for NCS conditions and Arctic conditions and the differences are 
marked. 
 An important factor when establishing PM- intervals for the Arctic is that the work is done 
when it is possible due to weather, and to schedule it in such a way that the maintenance 
process is constant, with a stable amount of work for the maintenance personnel and to 
schedule it in such a way that production downtime is minimized. 
The preventive maintenance described in the thesis and the intervals proposed will need to be 
revised based on plant specific variables, information from maintenance personnel, new 
technology, experience etc. 
6.2 The seawater cooling system and firewater system 
In this thesis two systems that are important on an oil installation are chosen, a sea water lift 
pump system and a fire water pump system on an FPSO. These systems have the approx. 
same capability characteristics, but very different characteristics when it comes to used hours, 
safety criticality, redundancies etc.  In the following subchapters the two systems in the case 
study will be described. 
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6.2.1 Firewater Pump package: 
The system focused on in the thesis is the system for firefighting on the installation. Its main 
function is to stop, limit, control and put out fires by using seawater, seawater/foam and water 
mist systems. The firewater system will be placed in the hull of the FPSO with piping leading 
to the different sections in the hull, process, accommodation, turret section and helideck. The 
system is self contained, meaning it is capable of performing its function independent of other 
systems on the installation. This system also covers the fire hydrants, fire hoses and sprinkler 
systems placed on the FPSO.  
 
Figure 6.1 Process diagram, firewater system 
The firewater system consists of four individual submerged pumps that is driven by four 
submerged electrical motors (6,6 kV, 60 Hz) cooled by a mixture of water and glycol. The 
cooling medium is stored in tanks censored with high level and low level alarms, and is 
measured with temperature sensors with high level alarm, this is because an increase in the 
temperature of the cooling fluid is a signal that something is wrong with the pump. 
Each of the four pumps is identical and set up in a 4x50% configuration (redundancy 4x50%). 
The pumps can function at max capacity 3300 m
3
/hr for eighteen hours. To protect the pumps 
they are monitored by  magnetic minimum flow censors who control flow regulators that 
regulate the flow.  
Downstream of the pump there are pressure indicators. Differential pressure indicators 
measure the pressure over the intake filters and indicate clogging or damage in these. 
To mitigate the growth of algae and bacteria the water at the intake is constantly added copper 
and hypochlorite from another system.    
The diesel generator units have an effect of 3125 kVA and are equipped with two independent 
24DC starter engines. A dedicated pump in the generator circulates lubrication oil at given 
intervals. The cooling is supplied with seawater delivered from the firewater pump it is 
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running. The generator exhaust is condition monitored with temperature censors. The 
generator control panels are separate units which control the whole power generating system, 
these panels show the alarms, process values, controls and survey the condition monitoring 
systems for lube oil system, circulation pumps, cooling system etc. 
Two pumps called jockey pumps starts if the pressure in the firewater system sinks, these are 
electrical driven vertical centrifugal pumps designed to work at 100% 85 m^3/h. These pumps 
are rigged with differential pressure transmitters on the filters that give alarm if the filters 
need change. 
The fire water is pumped up from the sea into a large fire water ring, this is a large diameter 
pipe with high pressure water that goes on the outside of the platform. The fire water ring 
goes on the outside of the installation because a rupture in this pipe would lead to the platform 
filling with water. This fire water ring has two closing valves to isolate it if there is a rupture. 
All the firefighting systems get their water from this fire water ring.  
6.2.2 Seawater cooling system: 
The seawater systems function is to deliver seawater to oil- and gas coolers, gas compressors, 
pumps and generators that use seawater as cooling medium. To mitigate algae- and bacterial 
growth copper and hypochlorite is added to the water from a separate system. 
The system consists of three submersible centrifugal pumps (3x50% redundancy) with intake 
hoses which take in water from a water depth of 50m to ensure constant temperature and low 
growth of algae in the system. The pumps are designed to deliver 6600 m
3
/hr. Each of these 
pumps has minimum flow valves and pressure sensors in the outlet. Downstream of the 
pumps it is placed filter designed to filter away all particles bigger than 80 microns. 
In the system there are two circulation pumps (2x100) which pump hot seawater from a return 
manifold and mix it with seawater to get the wanted temperature. This mix is then delivered 
back to various cooling systems such as oil coolers, wet gas coolers, and inlet coolers. 
A hydrocarbon analyzer is placed on the return manifold to discover leaks into the system.  
The system also has a series of feed pumps going to other systems on the installation. This is 
to the forward fresh water cooler, to the fresh water generators, to the main generators and to 
the inert gas system.  
The seawater system is normally configured to use two pumps 50% and have one in reserve, 
each of the pumps are run by a 11 kV electrical motor with its own cooling circuit using a mix 
of water and glycol as a cooling medium. The water is pumped to a manifold for distribution. 
The flow through the coolers are based and regulated by temperature measurements of the 
water stream through the cooler. From the return manifold the seawater is led back to sea 
through a sea water caisson. This caisson is kept full with fluid to ensure a constant 
backpressure to the system. 
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Figure 6.2 Process diagram, seawater cooling system 
6.3  The systems in Arctic climate 
The working temperatures for the sea and firewater system will be much lower than for 
systems similar on the NCS.  Studies done by the Norwegian Polar Institute show that in 
temperate waters outside the Norwegian coast we find Atlantic water masses. It can be 
expected that the lowest sea temperatures at approx. 50 meters will be 1-2 degrees C. In  sub 
Arctic areas we find modified Atlantic water masses, and the temperatures can go down as 
low as to -1 degree Celsius (Ref table 3.1, Arctic water masses). For high Arctic areas the 
lowest temperatures we find at this depth can go down to as low as -1,9 degrees Celsius 
depending on salinity. Temperatures going into the sub-zero range will cause different strains 
on the system than water with a higher temperature.  
The failure rates used when describing the equipment in the next paragraph are gathered from 
the OREDA 2009 edition. The data on maintainable item for failure mode are used to get 
percentages of the total failure rate for a failure mechanism/failure mode combination. This 
gives a pin point on what parts of the equipment that fails most often, and where to focus the 
maintenance work. For the equipment where there is a lack of available statistical 
information, experience from oil companies and from electric- and mechanical engineers will 
be used to find possible failure modes. 
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6.3.1 Instrumentation 
 The basic functions of instrumentation is to measure a certain physical parameter such as 
vibration, temperature, level, gas content etc. and convert that parameter to an electrical signal  
and then perform actions such as displaying, controlling, trip alarms or do an executive action 
(shutdown system, start sprinkler etc.) 
Much modern instrumentation tend to have an exponential failure rate (Wheeler and Ganji 
2004), this means that in many cases preventive maintenance will have minimal benefit, and 
can actually increase the failure rate because of maintenance induced failures. The strategy 
behind instrumentation maintenance is to detect hidden failures and repair evident failures as 
they happen. Hidden random failures on safety critical instrumentation can be critical and 
these instruments should have periodic testing. It is also important to make sure that 
functional failure in one unit does not cause a dangerous situation through redundancies 
monitoring etc. Instrumentation subjected to time dependent failure modes such as catalytic 
gas detectors, detection windows, etc. must have periodic maintenance (ref. table A.5, 
appendix A).  
For  flow sensors the 25% of the failures originate in the sensing element due to mainly leaks. 
For level indicators this number is 66,7% due to mainly blockages.  For temperature sensors 
50% of the failures are due to electronics failures. 
For the fire and gas system instrumentation the function is to detect explosive gases, fire, heat 
or smoke and generate alarm and/or executive action dependent on the degree of hazard 
detected. These are all safety critical. Different failure modes for these is spurious alarms, 
optical sensors can be fouled and obscured and catalytic gas detectors can get contaminated 
and loose its effect. Data from the OREDA 2009 database show that the biggest reason for 
failures on fire and gas detectors are the detector head, for fire and gas detectors as much as 
83,77% of the failures origin from problems here.  For smoke/combustion sensors the largest 
amount of failures can be found in the cabling (84,62%). 
For Fire and gas detectors a periodic function testing will be done annually. 
Heat detectors is tested periodically with a heat source radiating lower heat than the one 
needed to trip alarms and do executive action, such as a heat gun
1
. 
Smoke detectors are tested and changed with different intervals because of degradation of 
radioactive ionization source (ref table. A.21, appendix A) 
Instrumentation in the Arctic: 
Cold temperatures make instrumentation fail more often, an oil company operating an oil 
installation in Arctic areas have reckoned that there will be one or more trip of alarm systems 
on their installation pr. month during the winter periods due to the cold weather affecting 
valves, instrumentation or freezes up air supply lines. This implies, a large increase in failures 
in comparison with the OREDA 2009 database. Ways to mitigate this is to use instruments 
that have been through cold soak tests at -40
◦
C, place transmitters within electric heated 
closures and fit instrument panels exposed to cold with space heaters and use cabling tested 
and proved for cold temperatures.  
                                                          
1
  Heat gun: Electric tool used to emit a stream of hot air, similar in shape and construction to a hairdryer. 
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Blizzards is also expected to be a problem for fire detection equipment on Arctic installations 
because wind and snowdrift leads to a setting off fire and gas alarms, in some cases it will be 
hard to investigate and repair for the installation personnel because of the bad weather. These 
blizzards come at different intervals depending on where in the Arctic the installation is 
situated. 
For more specific info see table A.6 and table A.22, Appendix A. 
6.3.2 Pumps: 
Submerged centrifugal pump: The submerged pumps are designed to be more or less 
maintenance free, there are no need for grease and lubrication due to bearing lubrication from 
the water passing through. Apart from damage the only factors reducing the pump effectivity 
is wear and marine growth. The only maintenance for this in temperate waters is a 
performance test of the pump every five years, if it is reduced more than 10% it will be pulled 
up and overhauled. This is a large operation demanding divers, and pulling of the pump-riser. 
Vertical centrifugal pump: This is a standing pump which uses a rotating impeller to increase 
fluid pressure. For these pumps the maintenance is split into daily checks for vibration, 
sounds and leaks during operation, and calendar based checks of flow rate every third month 
and change of oil, oil analysis, change of lubricants and mechanical inspection at set intervals.  
Maintainable parts causing failure (OREDA, 2009): 
 Instrumentation: 24,39% of total failures  
 Seals: 22,52% of total failures  
 Piping: 10,59% of total failures  
 Control unit: 3,15% of total failures  
These data show that instrumentation and seals cause the biggest percentage of failures. 
Instrumentation will be covered with own PM tasks (ref table B.13 and table B.14), the seals 
will covered by daily checks for leaks and mechanical inspections at set intervals (ref table 
B.1 in appendix B). 
Pumps in the Arctic: 
In correspondence with a Norwegian company with experience in offshore pumps, the 
technical manager (Eide, 2010) explains that the most critical aspect for pumps operating in 
polar areas are ice or slush clogging the sea caisson, suction filters or grating in front of the 
water intake. If this happens fast and the pump loses whole or parts of the suction string and 
the pump starts to cavitate, this can lead to vibrations destroying the shaft sealings and over 
time the pump bearings. These problems are well known from ship pumps operating in polar 
areas or for pumps sucking in water from areas close to the bottom where mud and vegetation 
can give the same effects.  
There are several ways commonly used to mitigate this: 
 Using alternative intakes if one is clogged 
 Periodic stops of the pump and use of pressurized air to blow away ice at the intake 
 Circulation of seawater through box coolers instead of taking new seawater into the 
ship or installation 
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For dry pumps on the installation the same failure modes and frequencies as on the NCS are 
expected. For pumps outside heat tracing and shelter may be necessary (ref. table B.2, 
appendix B). 
6.3.3 Electric motor 
Electric motors driving pumps: The electric motor produces mechanical energy by 
interactions between a magnetic field and an electric current and converts this into rotational 
power driving the pumps. The maintenance of these motors will be based on  the standard 
worked out by The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), (NFPA 70B-2006) which is 
the Recommended Practice for Electrical Equipment Maintenance, which is widely used in 
the North Sea. This standard recommends inspections every 1,5 months for vibrations and 
damages, lubrication analysis every fourth month, lubrication as proposed by manufacturer, 
annual electrical isolation tests, and a larger test every fourth year with thermo graphic check, 
change of worn parts and IR and continuity tests to find failings in cables and junction boxes. 
For safety critical high voltage motors (5 kV and above) will have monitoring of stator 
windings (NFPA, 2006).  
Maintainable parts causing failure (OREDA, 2009): 
 Subunit: 17,39% of total failures 
 Control unit:10,14% of total failures 
 Wiring:8,7% of total failures 
 Thrust bearing: 7,25% of total failures 
 Vibration instrumentation 5,8% of total failures 
For electrical motors in the firewater systems which are safety critical will have be tested at 
weekly intervals and a full scale test annually to verify that the motors and pumps can deliver 
their required amount of firewater (ref. table A.9, appendix A).  
Electric motors in the Arctic: 
All electrical motors situated outdoors and in areas without heating must have anti-
condensation heaters. And all cabling must be selected to be able to withstand bending and 
impact in low temperatures (ref. table A.10, appendix A) 
6.3.4 Tools, electric equipment, screens etc. 
As mentioned cold temperatures have various effects on tools and equipment. The biggest 
challenges in use of electric equipment in the Arctic are all kinds of electrical tools such as 
hand drills, saws etc. which have problems starting and breaks easily. Tools using engines 
also have the same problems with condensation, freezing of fuel etc. Other big problems are 
cables and cable terminations which break easily at sub-zero conditions and equipment with 
screens (especially touch screens) which stops working or get very long response times, 
keyboards and buttons stop working and equipment with batteries such as VHF (Very High 
Frequency) radios and telephones get a very limited battery capacity (Claes, 2010). 
There are also problems with mechanical equipment being brought from inside to outside, if 
these have been exposed to moist or condensation this freezes instantly when coming 
outdoors. 
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6.3.5 Electric heaters and heat tracing 
Electric heaters convert electric energy into heat which is transferred towards colder areas 
through conduction, convection and radiation. Heaters are divided into process heaters which 
heats electrical equipment and process and service fluids mainly through air convection, and 
domestic heaters  which heats inhabited areas. 
The heaters looked closer into in the assignment are all electrical equipment heaters. These 
heaters will be maintained at the same time as the equipment they are heating are checked, 
and will be electrical conductivity tests, and function testing of the heater control 
instrumentation (ref. table A.11 appendix A).  
Electrical trace heating: are used to maintain a pre-determined surface temperature in a 
material or fluid. Electrical trace heating will be very important on a winterized platform and 
are divided into the following types: 
 Constant wattage trace heating: Designed to give out a constant output, used on low to 
medium temperature duties 
 Self- limiting trace heating: This is self regulating heating cables which are used on 
low to high duties 
 Mineral insulated trace heating:  Pure resistance heaters and used for high duties. 
 Skin effect trace heaters: Use a ferromagnetic heat tube thermally coupled to the pipe 
that is heat traced and uses an automatic controller 
Heat tracing  in the Arctic: 
The maintenance activities for the electric trace heating will be designed to maintain 
functionality and prevent catastrophic failures. The failure modes are considered random for 
this equipment, so the maintenance will be in the form of periodic function testing and 
condition monitoring. The PM task on the NCS is function testing of frost protection circuits, 
controllers and process related circuits once before every winter. For Arctic areas which have 
a longer freezing period it is suggested to have one test before winter and one in the middle of 
winter (ref. table B.16 appendix B). 
Process fluid and water heaters are often more exposed and will have tests on continuity, 
insulation resistance and phase balance test together with visual inspections of heater 
elements and thermostats every fourth year (NFPA, 2006). 
6.3.6 Gearboxes 
Gearboxes are used in many of the motors on an oil and gas production facility. Gearbox 
maintenance programmes is typically divided into two main components: 
1. Mechanical condition activities to establish the state of the gearbox, this includes data 
trending, vibration monitoring and lube oil sampling.  Visual inspection will be done 
weekly to establish the state of the gearbox together with data uploading and trending 
from temperature sensors on the bearings and in the gearbox and oil level checks. 
Every fourth month there will be done an analysis of the lubricating oil. More 
extensive preventive maintenance like disassembling and changing of parts will follow 
the maintenance intervals of the driven units 
2. Function testing of gearboxes used intermittently every six months 
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Gearboxes in safety critical systems such as the ones in the firewater system will be tested as 
a part of the fire water system every week and with a large annual test to ensure that it can 
operate on demand (ref. table A.11, appendix A).  
Gearboxes in the Arctic: 
Gearboxes in the Arctic will have the same failure modes and frequencies as gearboxes on the 
NCS when situated inside. If outside they need heat tracing and oil capable of function in low 
temperatures (ref. table A.12, appendix A). 
6.3.7 Firewater diesel engine 
The firewater diesel engine is a safety critical combustion engine. It will undergo function 
testing every week, and performance tests every 12 months. Together with this it will undergo 
a large annual service and inspection (ref. table A.13 and table A.14 appendix A).  
Maintainable parts causing failure (OREDA, 2009): 
 Piping: 7,14% of total failures 
 Cylinders: 6,04% of total failures 
 Starting unit: 6,04% of total failures 
 Start energy: 5,49% of total failures 
 Valves: 5,04% of total failures 
 Exhaust: 4,4% of total failures 
 Control unit: 3,85% of total failures 
 Heat exchanger: 3,85% of total failures 
 Pumps: 3,3% of total failures 
 Temperature instrumentation: 3,3% of total failures 
These data show that the biggest fraction of failures are mechanical, this makes it important to 
have good preventive maintenance routines on the mechanical state of the engine.  
6.3.8 Firewater generator 
A generator is used to transform rotational energy into electrical energy. The fire water 
Generator set is an emergency/standby generator, and will be function tested with the diesel 
engine every week, and has a large performance test every year. There will also be monthly 
vibration and oil samplings and detailed inspections and if necessary overhauls every fourth 
year (ref. table A.18 and table A.19, appendix A). 
Maintainable parts causing failure (OREDA, 2009): 
 Control unit: 26,67% of total failures  
 Subunit: 16,67% of total failures 
 Instrumentation: 10% of total failures 
 Wiring: 6,67% of total failures 
The biggest percentage of generator failures can be found in the instrumentation, control unit 
and junction boxes. Instrumentation will be covered under own PM-tasks, therefore it is 
important to focus on cabling and the control unit in the preventive maintenance. 
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6.3.9 Piping in the Arctic 
All piping that is exposed to outside temperatures and contains liquids that can freeze must be 
protected. The fire ring main is probably the biggest and most exposed pipe on the 
installation. This ring on the outer deck on the platform will be subjected to freezing 
conditions and accumulation of ice and snow. A solution tried and tested on an onshore Arctic 
processing facility to use heat tracers along the pipe, under a thick layer of insulation, the 
pipes are instrumented with a temperature-sensing device that is activated when temperature 
drops below 5C. The insulation must be covered with metal to keep it from getting damaged. 
The valves on the pipe will be critical, in this area the heat tracing cables are laid down in 
loops around the valve to give more heat to this critical area, which has moving parts and 
more metal that needs heating. These loops must be big enough to give enough slack in a case 
where the valve has to be removed or maintained. All pipes going from the fire water ring to 
the systems inside of the platform should be insulated and heat traced in the same way 
through the outer walls. The insulation should go a distance into the heated area to prevent 
cold bridge effects from the pipe. 
6.3.10 Hose reels, hydrants and sprinklers 
All hose reels subjected to freezing conditions shall be fitted in cabinets with heat tracing. All 
hydrants and sprinklers must be self draining to stop freezing and corrosion, for sprinkler 
pipes pressurized air in the piping can be used for complete draining (ref. table A.23 and table 
A.24, appendix A). 
6.4 Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) of firewater 
pump 
In this chapter the FMECA analysis in the excel sheets will be further explained. For further 
information on the systems see appendix A and B, where they are covered in whole.  
The first column in the excel sheet shows the system discussed, and describes the main 
equipment. In the second column the main equipment are split down into component level. In 
Table 6.1 the FMECA of the firewater pump is shown. It is split into a pump component, an 
electrical motor, valves, filters, instrumentation and tanks. In the third column a short 
description of the components functions are given. The fourth and fifth column shows the 
components redundancy and criticality. All of these columns accept criticality will be the 
same for both Arctic and NCS areas, the criticality value are different for some components 
based on the possible consequences a failure can have, this is further explained in paragraph 
2.6, statistical theory. 
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Table 6.1 FMECA analysis, submersed firewater pump 
 
The next column in the Excel sheet is failure modes. Here different failure modes and their 
frequencies are gathered from the OREDA 2009 database to show the most common critical, 
degraded and incipient failures (ref chapter 2.6, statistical theory). In the failure mechanism 
column the most common failure mechanisms for the particular failure modes are given. The 
next columns show the percentage of failure mechanisms for the particular failure mode and 
the percentage of total failures in the component described. The column “man-hours repair” 
presents the average value of the repair time for the particular failure modes. The two next 
columns give a short summary of the Preventive time-based maintenance tasks and the 
intervals recommended to keep the equipment running with a high regularity and to mitigate 
failures. The last column show how many man-hours it is expected to use on the particular 
preventive maintenance task.  An example from table 6.2 for the submerged motor on the 
firewater pump on the NCS is; A critical breakdown in the circulation pump has a frequency 
of 342466 hours, which means the MTTF is 87565 hours (OREDA 2009). 26,8% of these 
breakdowns happen due to the failure mechanism, general mechanical failure, 13,4% due to 
earth/isolation faults in the motor and 13,4% due to wear. The next column “percentage of 
total failures” gives the value 1,56% which means that 1,56% of all failures observed in these 
pumps on the NCS are breakdowns due to general mechanical failures (OREDA 2009). The 
man-hours for repair for this failure mechanism are 336 hours.  The PM tasks for this pump 
on the NCS will be a performance test every five years, if the capacity of the pump the motor 
is running is reduced by 10% or more it will be pulled up and overhauled. The time estimated 
for the PM-task is 180 hours. The same FMECA analysis is done for the same equipment in 
Arctic conditions. Changes in each of the categories are identified and changes in PM-tasks, 
intervals and used man-hours are proposed. 
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Table 6.2 FMECA analysis, submersed electrical motor, filter and instrumentation. 
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6.5 Sea water lift pump in Norwegian Continental Shelf and Arctic 
conditions 
In this chapter some examples from the excel sheet are shown to explain how to interpret the 
results. Further results are in the excel sheet in the appendix B. The first equipment 
considered is the seawater lift pumps.  
 
Table 6.3 Differences between NCS and Arctic offshore for sea water lift pumps 
  Norwegian Continental Shelf Arctic offshore 
Criticality 
The criticality of this system are defined as 
high and not safety critical on the NCS, this 
is because a failure in this system might lead 
to large costs, but small consequences for 
human life and the environment. 
Safety critical. Because of a larger need 
for cooling water to keep the main 
generators and essential generators 
running and a lower supportability. 
Failure in system might cause 
environmental and safety 
consequences. 
 
 
Redundancy 
The system consists of two pumps with one 
in reserve each capable of delivering 50% of 
the needed water, which gives a redundancy 
value of 3x50%. 
 
A identical setup of the system is 
considered, Redundancy increase is 
proposed. 
 
 
Failure 
modes 
The failure modes are taken from OREDA 
2009 data on failures on sea water lift 
pumps on the NCS. The two most common 
critical failure modes are failure to start on 
demand and vibrations. 
The same failure modes are considered. 
A general increase in failure modes is 
expected due to the cold water and 
possibilities of ice clogging the intake 
filter leading to cavitation. 
 
 
 
Failure 
mechanisms 
The most common failure mechanism for 
failure to start on demand is general 
instrument failure. For vibration failure 
mode it is clearance/alignment failures and 
general mechanical failures.  
An increase in especially the failure 
mechanisms blockage and general 
mechanical failure can be expected due 
to ice problems. 
 
Frequency 
The frequency of failures is taken from the 
OREDA handbook for seawater lift pumps 
on the NCS. We can see that the most 
common critical failure is external leakage 
of process medium with a MTBF of 66622 
hours which is every 7,6 years. The most 
common failure is abnormal instrument 
readings which has a MTBF of 38986 hours 
which is every 4,45 years. 
Because of cold fluids in the pump 
there are possibilities of ice and slush 
related problems the frequency of 
problems can be expected to increase. 
Especially spurious stops, vibration and 
leaks can be expected to increase. The 
filter downstream of the pump will also 
be more subjected to damage because 
of ice and slush clogging or forming in 
the filter element. This can be 
monitored with differential pressure 
measurement over the filter element. 
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PM-tasks 
The pulling of a seawater lift pump is an 
extensive operation where divers or ROV`s 
are needed. Because the pump is considered 
non-critical. It is chosen to schedule a 
performance test every five years of the 
pump. If the flow is reduced 10% or more it 
is pulled and overhauled. 
The 60 flow test is increased to one 
after every winter season to find 
possible damages caused by ice. 
Man-hours 
If the pump has to be pulled this is a large 
operation demanding 336 man-hours (168 
pulling and 168 placing spare pump). 
If the pump is pulled during winter 
season a higher demand of work hours 
can be expected due to smaller weather 
windows for divers and ROV`s 
(Remote operated vehicles) and colder 
weather leading to slower work (ref. 
chapter 6.9). 
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Table 6.4 Case study, Seawater lift pump, NCS 
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Table 6.5 Case suty, Sea water lift pump, Arctic 
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6.6 Fire detectors in Norwegian Continental Shelf and Arctic conditions 
From the firewater system the example will be a infrared fire detector, this is a small piece of 
equipment but there will be many such detectors around the installation meaning that 
increases in scheduled maintenance and work hours will sum up to a large amount of hours. 
Most of the fire detectors have self diagnosting systems, in this case a infrared fire detector 
without a self diagnosting system will be considered. The infrared fire detector in the case 
study is situated outside. For FMECA analysis of the whole firewater system, see appendix A. 
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Table 6.6 Differences between NCS and Arctic offshore for infrared fire detectors situated 
outdoors 
  Norwegian Continental Shelf Arctic offshore 
Failure 
modes 
The failure modes for a fire detector are 
taken from the OREDA 2009 database 
For the Arctic instrumentation is 
expected to have more spurious alarms 
due to frost affecting the instrumentation, 
we can also expect that blizzards and 
snowdrift can set off the fire detectors. 
Failure 
mechanisms 
General instrument failures, out of 
adjustment and contamination are the most 
important failure modes for these kind of 
sensors. 
For these sensors we can expect a higher 
degree of contamination on the lens 
because of ice, and more frequent general 
instrument failures. 
Frequency 
Erratic output is the most frequent failure 
mode. 
The failure mode erratic output is 
expected to increase due to increase in 
the failure mechanism contamination, this 
is because of ice and snowdrift problems 
on sensor head. 
PM-tasks 
The PM-tasks will consist of a Check of 
fastening, check for objects blocking sensor, 
visual inspection for damages and a 
cleaning of the sensor lens every 12 months. 
Every 84 months there is a scheduled 
change of batteries. 
Interval on check of fastening, check for 
objects blocking sensor, visual inspection 
for damages and a cleaning of the sensor 
lens are increased to every 6 months. The 
scheduled change of batteries must be 
increased because of cold temperatures 
draining the power, 24 months is 
suggested in the case study. 
Man-hours 
For the NCS the needed amount of man-
hours is set to one hour, the work is 
expected to go fast, but due to placing 
access can be hard. 
For the Arctic the needed amount of man-
hours are set to one hour during summer 
season, and two hours during winter 
season because of use of heavier clothes, 
cold fingers, bad weather etc. 
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Table 6.7 Case study, Infrared fire detector NCS 
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Table 6.8 Case study, Infrarefired fire detector, Arctic 
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6.7 Failure scenario in the Arctic for the seawater cooling system 
Scenarios on systems failing which is undramatic on the NCS might prove dangerous in the 
Arctic due to the Metrologic, oceanographic and supportability differences. Here two 
scenarios are identified and described for the two systems discussed in the case study. 
On a platform there are a large degree of redundancy in the power generating systems and 
these very seldom go down. On an Arctic installation the strains on the machinery can be 
bigger and the low supportability that can be experienced at times can lead to higher risks of 
such a scenario. In this scenario there is a breakdown in the seawater lift system.  On a 
platform the main power is delivered by the main generators (typically 20-40 Mega Volt-
amperes (MVA)). The setup of the generators is different from installation to installation 
depending on  the effect needed to run all the systems. in this case it is assumed that the 
installation has three main generators, two essential generators and an emergency generator.  
In this setup the three main generators have a 40 MVA effect and delivers power to the whole 
platform, the essential generators deliver an effect of 8 MVA and the emergency generators 
deliver 2,5 MVA. If the main generators go down the essential generators start and can deliver 
effect to the installation for a short time. If these generators go down the emergency generator 
which have a capacity of 2,5 MVA kicks in, this one only delivers power to emergency lights, 
evacuation systems, process shutdown systems, the fire systems, the communication, the 
alarm systems and restart systems for the main and essential generators. Other power 
generating possibilities on the platform is the UPS battery banks which for this example has 
effects of 4x300 kVA and the generators on the firefighting systems which are self sufficient 
diesel generators. 
In the scenario described here the platform experiences a failure in the sea water cooling 
systems which delivers cooling water to the generators and the essential generators and most 
of the other systems on the installation. A failure on all three seawater pumps (3x50%) is very 
unlikely, but if pumps which are not designed for Arctic operations are used, the hard 
conditions can lead to problems. Such a failure leads to an overheating situation on the 
generators leading to a shutdown. The heating and heat tracing on an Arctic installation will 
need much power in cold periods. With a loss of heating and trace heating the liquid filled 
systems, pipes, valves, etc. will be exposed to freezing problems and domestic areas will 
become very cold. It is possible to design Arctic offshore installations with bigger emergency 
diesel generators, bigger UPS battery banks, or possibilities to draw power to heating from for 
example the firewater generators. Another possibility is to use power cables from standby 
supply vessels to draw power from these in an emergency.  But with the regular setup for 
NCS systems the heating of all systems on the platform could not be upheld by the emergency 
systems. This scenario shows the importance of scenario identification from analyses (Fault 
tree analysis, Failure Modes, Effects, Criticality Analysis), correct design, PM-routines and 
competence from personnel to fix the problems in periods of isolation because of weather or 
ice. 
6.8 Failure scenario in the Arctic for a fire detector 
A scenario is that a false alarm, fire or a malfunction causes the sprinkler system to start in 
very cold weather, as stated in paragraph 6.3.1 instrumentation affected by cold temperatures 
fail more often, and an oil company working in Arctic conditions have assumed that there will 
be one or more trip of alarm systems on their installation pr. month  due to the cold weather. 
Saltwater sprayed into areas or draining into areas with minus degrees can freeze, causing 
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icing on the superstructure, in gangways, on machinery etc. This can cause machine and 
component failures, especially for electronics, evacuation problems, etc. The water will cause 
a rapid cool down that can be stronger than the heating effect delivered by the heat tracing. If 
the system is flushing for a prolonged period of time, this can have large synergistic effects on 
other systems and be expensive because of downtime and repairs on other systems. 
6.9 Economic case 
The cost perspective is very important for an oil and gas production facility. Based on 
information from the research, the FMECA analyses and the differences identified in 
preventive maintenance in the case study, an economic model is developed. The model 
estimates the economic impact Arctic conditions cause on maintenance and corrective repairs. 
This model can give a better basis for planning maintenance operations, and show the 
estimated delays in the maintenance work.  
Because of the lack of statistical data on environment factors and data on maintenance and 
repair times in the Arctic the factors in the model will be based on assumptions. The factors in 
the model will be very different for different areas and plant specific variables. As more data 
becomes available on the climate the oil and gas installation is working in, experience data on 
maintenance times etc. the model can be updated and the results will get stronger. But the 
model is a good tool to play with different operational and maintenance scenarios. In order to 
develop the model Monte Carlo simulation method is used. Monte Carlo simulation is useful 
when modeling phenomena with significant uncertainties in the input. The method relies on 
random sampling to compute the results. Series of discrete random events is generated to 
establish a probability distribution (CSEP, 2010). The method is widely used and can be a 
more certain tool than other alternative methods or human intuition, because it gives a 
probability distribution instead of one discrete value. 
The consequences for longer repair and maintenance times will be different from equipment 
to equipment, from process equipment where downtime can be very expensive to routine 
maintenance operations where the only cost is the man-hours for the personnel. The model 
gives the amount of hour’s delay that can be expected, this can be multiplied with the cost per 
hour to get the cost of the delay. 
The factors influencing man-hours identified for the model is: 
 Weather: Cold weather, strong winds, rain and snow make the work go slower. 
 Darkness: Darkness makes work go slower 
 Sea ice: Sea ice features can delay the operations, especially for operations where 
divers and ROV`s are needed. 
 Equipment failure: Failures in tools, cranes etc. used for the task due to Arctic 
conditions makes work go slower. These failures can be due to increased strains on 
machinery, larger risk of human errors etc. (ref chapter 3).  
 Delivery of parts, weather and infrastructure: Delivery of parts needed for the 
operation that is not stored on the platform and is delayed because of weather or bad 
infrastructure 
 Delivery of parts, sea ice: Delivery of parts needed for the operation that is not stored 
on the platform and is delayed due to sea ice features 
These factors will vary a lot depending on several different aspects. If the equipment is placed 
indoors or sheltered the weather will not have any effect on the task itself, and the same 
conditions as on the NCS is expected, but delivery of parts can still be a problem. Sea ice will 
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only be a problem in certain geographical areas, climatic conditions will vary a lot based on 
season and geographic loction of the installation. These data have to be put into the model for 
the results to have any value. It is possible to divide the factors into supportability, 
maintainability and reliability and assign values to these based on the factors described in the 
model, but for this model the direct input is choosen.  
Scenario: After the winter season on an FPSO in the Barents Sea the annual flow test of the 
seawater lift pumps show that one of the pumps have been damaged during the winter season 
and have lost much of its capacity. A replacement and corrective repair must be done. The 
seawater lift pump has a 3x50% redundancy, with one of the pumps shutdown for repair, the 
system is still fully operational, but the system redundancy is now 2x50%. The sea water 
cooling system is safety critical to keep the cooling of the generators running to ensure heat 
tracing and heating of the installation meaning that corrective repairs has to be done as fast as 
possible.   
The pulling and replacing of the seawater lift pump is an extensive operation where external 
experts have to be present. An oil company operating on the NCS schedule 168 hours for 
pulling the pump and 168  hours for placing the spare (336 hours in total), external experts are 
needed for the operation, these are paid per hour on the platform, meaning that a one day 
delay increases the manhours spent on the operation by 24 hours. The Arctic conditions will 
as discussed in chapter 4 possibly influence the supportability and maintainability of the 
equipment and make the operation take longer time.  
Based on the information on Arctic conditions and the task to be performed a set of 
assumptions are made. In the model it is assumed that the amount of man-hours used without 
delays will be the same as on the NCS (336 hours). Based on the research work done in the 
assignment different Arctic factors are assigned probability distributions on how they will 
affect the used man-hours for the operation.   
Table 6.9 Assumptions in Monte Carlo simulation 
 
Table 6.9 show the minimum, the mean and the maximum addition to manhours for the task 
in Arctic conditions. The mean values are set in the input for all factors except for the 
“delivery of supplies, weather”, where the median value is set. The min values are calculated 
with formula [5], the max values are calculated by changing the min% with the max% 
percentage value for increase in manhours. 
[5]  FCA min(hrs) = ∑((W(min%) x ENCS) + (D(min%) x ENCS) + (MF(min%) x 
ENCS) + (DSW(min%) x ENCS) + (SI(min%) x ENCS) + (DSI(min%) x ENCS)) 
Where FCA min(%) is the smallest increase in forecast additional manhours (%) defined in 
the assumption and ENCS is estimated manhours for the NCS. The other abbreviations is: W 
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is weather, D is darkness, MF is machine failures, DSW is delivery of supplies, weather, SI is 
sea ice and DSI is delivery of supplies, sea ice.  
Input distributions: 
Weather (Figure 6.3): The transition between winter and spring is a period where harsh 
weather can be experienced in the Barents sea with low temperatures, storms and blizzards. 
The operation pulling and installing a spare pump is weather sensitive. The weather is 
modelled as a triangular distribution assigned  values from 0-101 hours  (0-30%)  increase in 
man-hours with a likeliest value of 84 hours (25%).  
 
Figure 6.3 Triangular distribution of increase in manhours due to weather 
Darkness (Figure 6.4): Early spring in the Barents Sea means that there are little daylight. 
This can be mitigated by the use of artificial light, but is still modelled as a triangular 
distribution assigned with the value 0-17 hours (0-5%) with a likeliest value of 10 hours ( 3%) 
increase in manhours because of strain on personnel, areas without lighting etc. This value is 
assigned a correlation of 50% to the weather. Figure 6.3 illustrates how the delays due to 
darkness is correlated to the delays due to bad weather, on the figure the grey line show the 
weather distribution and the green dots show the results for darkness. 
 
Figure 6.4 Triangular distribution of increase in manhours due to darkness 
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Figure 6.5 Correlation between darkness and weather 
Sea ice: Sea ice will not be considered in this scenario. 
Equipment failure (Figure 6.6): Failures in tools and equipment is modelled as a triangular 
distribution assigned with the values 0-34 hours ( 0-10%) increase in workhours with a 
likeliest value of  17 hours (5%). It is assumed that the main equipment and systems are 
designed to cope with Arctic conditions, but the strains will still be higher in cold weather, the 
risk of human errors is higher, etc. Failures of hand tools and tools used for the repair is 
covered in this factor. This factor is 80% correlated to the weather, because in good weather 
the same failure frequency is expected for the NCS as for the Arctic. 
 
Figure 6.6 Triangular distribution of increase in manhours due to equipment failure 
Delivery of parts and specialists due to weather and infrastructure (Figure 6.7): This factor is 
Gamma distributed and assigned the value 0-1008 hours  (0-300%) increase in man-hours 
with a median value of  25 hours (7,5%). It is assumed that a spare pump is stored on the 
platform, but other parts, tools and experts needed might be delayed. This factor is considered 
weather sensitive and 80% correlated with the weather because bad weather is expected to 
give the largest delays for this case. The 300% delay will be very rare, and caused by for 
example long storm periods, equipment deliveries over long distances with truck, etc. 
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Figure 6.7 Gamma distribution of increase in manhours due to delays caused by 
weather and bad infrastructure 
The largest uncertainty in the model is found in this distribution, it has a variance of 1488 
hours due to the uncertainty in data. The Gamma distribution for the supply delays from 
weather gives very low chances for delays over 200 hours, this is due to difficulties in making 
distributions with a likeliest value much lower than the max value. If statistical data on 
weather can be obtained this can be solved by making discrete probability distributions based 
on the weather observations.  
Delivery of parts and specialists due to sea ice: This factor is assigned the value 0% in this 
example because ice features is not expected in the part of the Barents Sea assessed for this 
season.  
Of all of these factors the weather is expected to be the most important, and it is expected that 
there is a correlation between some of the other factors to bad weather. This assumption is 
based on the fact that the dark period coincides with the period with the worst weather, the 
reliability of the equipment is lower in bad weather, risk of human errors increase (ref. chapter 
3) and the delivery of spare parts is weather sensitive. 
Based on the probability distrubutions described, a Monte Carlo simulation with 100000 trials 
is run giving the gamma distribution shown in Figure 6.6. The distribution has a mean 
increase in manhours of 125 hours with a variance of 4005 hours. The large variance 
illustrates that there are large uncertainties in the estimate, this will get better when more data 
on the input distributions are gained from experience and analyses. In spite of the large 
uncertainties the model gives reason to believe that for this operation there will be an increase 
in man-hours due to Arctic conditions. 
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Figure 6.8 Estimated increase in manhours 
By using Figure 6.6 a probability of 50% of delays between 75 and 155 hours is identified, 
To find the economic consequence of this delay the price pr. manhour is analysed, for this 
case where there are no production downtime this will be solely the price pr. hour pr. worker. 
In this case it is assumed that the price pr. manhour pr. external specialist is 650 NOK. This 
assumption gives a 50% chance that the increase in costs for this task is between 48750 NOK 
and 102700 NOK (22-47% increase in costs). The mean cost increase identified in the model 
will be 81988 NOK (37%). If the worst case scenario defined in the assumption happen  the 
delay will be 1160 hours meaning a cost increase of 754000 (345%), based on this model the 
chance for this is neglectible. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
Arctic conditions will give challenges regarding RAMS factors on an offshore oil and gas 
production installation. The availability of the equipment can be kept high by identifying 
measures and designing for reliability, maintainability and supportability. As discussed in the 
results of this study, the reliability can be kept high through using reliable equipment designed 
for Arctic operating conditions, increase redundancies and by the use of shelters, heaters and 
heat tracing. The maintainability can be kept high by designing the equipment with 
ergonomics ensuring a good human-machine interface in Arctic conditions, sheltered 
workspaces, good illumination and by conscious maintenance planning and scheduling. The 
supportability challenges can be partially mitigated by having good spare part plans, large 
storage capacity offshore, ensurance of high internal competence through training and hiring 
of skilled personnel and by the use of integrated operations. 
The results of the study also indicate that the preventive maintenance will assume greater 
importance in keeping the regularity high and lowering the risks through repairs, assessing the 
state of the equipment, mapping degradation factors, etc. Since the preventive maintenance 
will also be affected by the harsh environment, there will be a need to consider all the 
challenges presented in this study while planning and executing the preventive maintenance 
tasks. For the equipment situated indoors, the maintenance time and procedures will be 
similar to the equipment in the offshore in the temperate areas in North Sea. However, the 
equipment in the arctic will have higher criticality values due to possibilities of colder process 
fluids, changes in systems, as well as their influence on the utility systems that may directly or 
indirectly influence the safety of personnel on board. This equipment might need to have 
maintenance scheduled more often as compared to equipment in the temperate areas. The 
equipment situated in weather affected areas might have bigger strains and might need 
maintenance and checks more often than similar equipment on the NCS. Moreover, in the 
arctic areas, there will be additional auxiliary equipment such as heaters, heat tracing, etc. that 
needs to be maintained.  In addition, the maintenance in arctic will be limited to summer 
seasons to lessen the strain on the personnel. The maintenance will take longer time both in 
preparation and in action due to cold weather, need for protective clothing, darkness and other 
arctic influencing factors identified in this study. 
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8. Future research 
Based on the findings in the thesis some points for future research is suggested, these are 
listed here:  
 Quantitative data on failure modes, failure mechanisms and failure frequencies would 
increase the accuracy of analyses on reliability, availability of equipment, and ease 
planning of both design, operations and maintenance. These data will also be useful in 
identifying risks and establish regularity goals for the installation. 
 More data on Arctic physical conditions will give a better possibility to plan design of 
the installation, operations and maintenance. These data would strengthen models such 
as the Monte Carlo simulation used in this assignment, and give better a better base for 
engineering decisions. 
 Data on Reliability, availability, maintainability and supportability in the Arctic 
should be gathered and analyzed to further increase the base for making engineering 
decisions and  operation and maintenance decisions. 
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Appendix A FMECA Analysis, firewater System 
  
 70 
Table A.1. FMECA, Firewater pump, NCS 
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Table  A.2 FMECA, Firewater pump, Arctic 
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Table  A.3. FMECA, Submerged electrical motor and filter for firewater pump, NCS 
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Table  A.4 FMECA Submerged electrical motor and filter, Arctic 
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Table  A.5 FMECA, Instrumentation pump, header tank and instrumentation on header tank, NCS 
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Table  A.6 FMECA, Instrumentation on pump, header tank for cooling fluid and instrumentation on 
header tank, Arctic 
 
  
 76 
Table  A.7 FMECA, Jockey pump and instrumentation pump, NCS 
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Table  A.8 FMECA, Jockey pump and instrumentation on pump, Arctic 
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Table  A.9 FMECA, Filter on firewater jockey pump, electric motor, NCS 
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Table  A.10 FMECA, Filter on firewater jockey pump and el. Motor on pump, Arctic 
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Table  A.11 FMECA, Gearbox and electrical heater, NCS 
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Table  A.12 FMECA, Gearbox and electrical heater, Arctic 
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Table  A.13 FMECA, Diesel engine, NCS 
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Table  A.14 FMECA, Diesel engine, Arctic 
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Table  A.15 FMECA, Diesel day tank, control panel and electrical heater, NCS 
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Table  A.16 FMECA, Diesel day tank, control panel and Diesel start engines, Arctic 
 
 
  
 86 
Table  A.17 FMECA Electrical heater on start engine and generator, NCS 
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Table  A.18 FMECA, Elecric heater on start engine and generator, Arctic 
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Table  A.19 FMECA, Generator cooling pump and jacket water preheating pump, NCS 
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Table  A.20 FMECA, Generator cooling pump and jacket water preheating pump, Arctic 
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Table  A.21 FMECA, fire detectors, NCS 
 
 
 
  
 91 
Table  A.22 FMECA, Detectors, Arctic 
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Table  A.23 FMECA, Sprinkler system, trace heating and hosereel with space heater, NCS 
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Table  A.24 FMECA, Sprinkler system, trace heating, Hosereel with space heater, Arctic 
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Appendix B FMECA analysis, seawater cooling system 
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Table B.1 FMECA, Seawater lift pump, NCS 
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Table B.2 FMECA, Seawater lift pump, Arctic 
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Table B.3 FMECA, Submerg. el. Motor, Instrumentation pump and filter in firewater pump, NCS 
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Table  B.4 FMECA, Submerged el motor, instrumentation on pump, filter for seawater pump, Arctic 
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Table B.5 FMECA, Instrumentation electrical motor, Header tank for cooling fluid and 
Instrumentation on header tank, NCS 
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Table B.6 FMECA, Instrumentation on el. motor, header tank for cooling fluid and instrumentation on 
header tank, Arctic 
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Table B.7 FMECA, Seawater circulation pump, NCS 
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Table B.8 FMECA, Seawater circulation pump, Arctic 
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Table B.9 FMECA, Instrumentation pump and filter on seawater circulation pump, NCS 
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Table B.10 FMECA, Instrumentation on seawater circulation pump and filter, Arctic 
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Table B.11 FMECA, Electrical motor and gearbox, NCS 
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Table B.12 FMECA, Electrical motor and gearbox, Arctic 
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Table B.13 FMECA, Heater and instrumentation on EL. Motor, feed pump to main generators and 
instrumentation on pump, NCS 
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Table B.14 FMECA, Heater and instrumentation on EL. Motor, feed pump to main generators and 
instrumentation on pump, Arctic 
 
  
 109 
Table B.15 FMECA. Trace heating, NCS 
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Table B.16 FMECA, trace heating, Arctic 
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